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Ordinary Clients, Overreaching Lawyers, and the Failure to Implement 
Adequate Client Protection Measures 
Leslie C. Levin* 
 Individual clients are often vulnerable. When they hire a lawyer, it may be the first and 
only time they do so. These clients are frequently seeking help with problems that deeply affect 
their lives such as criminal, family, or personal injury matters. Some end up in disputes with 
their lawyers over money. Every year, thousands of clients are victimized by overreaching 
lawyers who overcharge or refuse to return unearned fees.1 Some actually steal client money. Of 
course, there are rules of professional conduct governing the ways in which lawyers are required 
to handle client money.2 The penalties when lawyers violate those rules can be severe.3 
Nevertheless, problems with fee disputes and lawyer overreaching continue to occur. Forty years 
ago, the American Bar Association (ABA) began to recommend that states adopt additional 
“client protection measures” to better protect clients’ financial interests and provide recourse for 
clients who were victimized by their lawyers.4  Unfortunately, most jurisdictions have declined 
 
*  Hugh Macgill Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I thank Susan Fortney for 
her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am also deeply grateful to University of 
Connecticut Law Librarians Adam Mackie, Tanya Johnson, Maryanne Daly-Doran, and Anne Rajotte for 
their invaluable research assistance. 
1 The precise number is not known. However, from 2017-2019, thirteen jurisdictions reported that their 
client protection funds paid an average of 1,279 claims annually for unearned fees. See ABA Center on 
Professional Responsibility, Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, at 8 (2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2017-2019-cp-
survey.pdf [hereafter Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019]. This figure does not 
include claims for unearned fees in the other thirty-eight jurisdictions. Nor does it include unearned fees 
that were eventually repaid by lawyers or instances of fee overcharging that were subsequently resolved. 
2 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).  
3 See, e.g., In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153, 1158 (N.J. 1999) (stating that in misappropriation cases, 
“mitigating factors will rarely override the requirement of disbarment”); CONN. PRAC. BOOK 2-47A 
(2021) (providing that knowing misappropriation of client’s funds shall result in disbarment for minimum 
of twelve years). 
4 The ABA identifies several measures aimed at protecting clients’ financial interests as “client protection 
measures” including, inter alia, mandatory fee arbitration, trust account overdraft notification, insurance 
payee notification, random audits of trust accounts, and client protection funds. See Client Protection 
Information – Resources by Topic (2015), ABA, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/standingcom
mitteeonclientprotection/clientprotectioninformation/. The ABA also describes most of these measures 
and written fee agreements as “loss prevention” rules. Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 
2017-2019, supra note 1, at 42-49. In this article, the term “client protection measures” is used to refer to 
all of these measures. 
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to adopt many of those measures or did so incompletely. The reasons why this has happened and 
the consequences for ordinary clients have been largely unexplored.5 
 The failure to adequately protect these clients occurs from the outset of the lawyer-client 
relationship. Most jurisdictions do not require lawyers to put their fee arrangements (except 
contingent fees) in writing.6 Yet the absence of written agreements makes fee disputes more 
likely, and many individual clients cannot afford to litigate the disputes in court. Consequently, 
clients may be unable to obtain the return of unearned fees or feel forced to pay fees they do not 
owe. While most jurisdictions offer fee arbitration when disputes arise, the vast majority do not 
follow the ABA’s Model Rules for Fee Arbitration recommendation requiring lawyers to 
participate in the process.7 Many jurisdictions have also failed to implement certain other ABA-
recommended client protection measures—such as the Model Rules for Payee Notification and 
the Model Rule for Random Audit of Lawyer Trust Accounts—that would help deter lawyer theft 
of client money or facilitate detection.8 And even though all jurisdictions have established client 
protection funds to reimburse clients for unearned fees or stolen money that is otherwise 
unrecoverable, many do not even attempt to fully compensate clients, as recommended by the 
ABA.9 
 To be clear: the focus here is on client protection measures that help protect ordinary 
individuals. Large corporate clients do not, for the most part, need this protection. They are 
sophisticated consumers of legal services with significant clout.10 Large corporate clients will 
almost certainly require a written engagement agreement in the unlikely event that their law firm 
does not offer to provide one.11 These clients have the financial resources to sue their lawyers 
 
5 The exception is articles that discuss the failure to require written fee agreements. See Lawrence A. 
Dubin, Client Beware: The Need for a Mandatory Written Fee Agreement Rule, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 93 
(1998); Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional Responsibility of the Legal 
Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 365, 403-405 (2013). 
6 See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 181, 193, 195 and accompanying text. The only significant client protection measure 
most states have adopted is trust account overdraft notification. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying 
text. 
9 See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION Preamble, R. 3(a)  (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1989); infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text. 
10 See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 816-17, 872, 879-80 
(1990). 
11 Corporate clients often wish to insert their own terms into the agreements governing lawyer 
representation. See Max Welsh, Lawyers Should Negotiate Outside Counsel Guidelines, LAW PRAC. 
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over legal fees. If their lawyer steals or overcharges, the lawyer’s law firm will often make the 
corporate client whole.12 It is individual clients—typically less sophisticated users of legal 
services—who can least afford to lose their money to lawyers and who most need these client 
protection measures.13 
 The organized bar bears some—but by no means exclusive—responsibility for the failure 
to adequately protect these clients. On the national level, the ABA plays a very important role in 
lawyer regulation through its development of model rules. These include the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct and the model rules for client protection described above. But the ABA’s 
model rules must be approved by the 600-member House of Delegates and often reflect 
compromises to accommodate lawyers’ interests.14 Once the ABA’s model rules are approved, 
each jurisdiction typically considers whether to adopt the rules in its own state.15 In the case of 
the ABA’s model rules for client protection, however, those rules, if adopted by jurisdictions at 
all, have often been adopted with variations that insufficiently protect clients’ interests.16 
 One reason this has occurred is because in many jurisdictions, the state bar 
organizations—and not the state supreme courts—take the lead in lawyer regulation. Courts are 
busy with their main work (deciding cases) and lawyer regulation is frequently not at the top of 
 
TODAY (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/lawyers-negotiate-outside-counsel-
guidelines/. 
12 See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers are Different and Why We are the Same: Creating 
Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote Ethical Behavior: In-House, Ethics Counsel, Bill 
Padding, and In-House Ethics Training, 44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 713 (2011); Ex-Drinker Bill Staff 
Attorney Suspended for Overbilling, AM. LAW. (May 27, 2015); see also Charges Against Barclay 
Damon Partner Stand Out Among Lawyer Theft Cases, N.Y. L.J. (June 20, 2018). 
13 Two recent examples of the victimization of individual clients involve prominent lawyers who 
allegedly stole millions from their personal injury clients. See Holly Barker, State Bar Claims Thomas 
Girardi Intentionally Stole from Clients, BLOOMBERG L. (March 31, 2021), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/state-bar-claims-thomas-girardi-intentionally-stole-from-
clients (describing alleged failure to pay $2 million to families of victims of airplane crash); Michael 
Finnegan, Michael Avenatti accused at fraud trial of stealing from client to buy private jet, L.A. TIMES 
(July 21, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-07-21/michael-avenatti-embezzlement-
trial-opens (describing, inter alia, theft of $4 million from paraplegic, mentally disabled client).  
14 See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 702-703, 710-16, 721-22 (1989). 
15 Every state but California has adopted some variation of the Model Rules for Professional Conduct. See 
Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting the Model Rules, ABA (2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profession
al_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/. 
16 See, e.g., infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.  
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their agendas.17 The supreme courts also have many other responsibilities including oversight of 
the state judicial system, budget preparation, lobbying the legislature for appropriations, and 
court reform.18 They often rely on bar organizations to bring ideas to them, study issues, hold 
hearings, make recommendations, and draft language effecting changes in lawyer regulation. Not 
surprisingly, the input from bar organizations tends to reflect lawyers’ concerns. For various 
reasons—including judges’ tendency to identify with lawyers’ interests—the courts often adopt 
the state bars’ recommendations.19  
 State bars vary in their role in lawyer regulation and their relationships to their states’ 
supreme courts. Nineteen states have voluntary state bars, which lawyers can choose to join.20 
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have mandatory bars, to which all lawyers in the 
jurisdiction must pay dues and belong.21 Mandatory bars are often established as state agencies 
or as instrumentalities of the judiciary.22 These bars typically claim that public protection is one 
of their goals and handle some regulatory functions such as admission or discipline.23 In most 
other respects, they perform the same functions as voluntary state bars.24 All state bars seek to 
 
17 See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 137 (2011). 
18 See Steven W. Hays & James W. Douglas, Judicial Administration: Modernizing the Third Branch, in 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1017 (Jack Rabin et al. eds, 3rd ed. 2007); Steven W. Hays, The 
Traditional Managers: Judges and Court Clerks, in HANDBOOK OF COURT ADMINISTRATION AND 
MANAGEMENT 221, 224 (Steven W. Hays & Cole Blease Graham, Jr., eds. 1993); Randall T. Shepard, 
The New Role of State Supreme Courts as Engines of Court Reform, 81 NYU L. REV. 1535, 1543-46 
(2006). 
19 See BARTON, supra note 17, at 1, 37; Leslie C. Levin, The Politics of Lawyer Regulation: The Case of 
Malpractice Insurance, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 969, 981 (2020). Of course, state bar organizations are 
not the only bar associations that recommend changes in lawyer regulation to the courts, but due to their 
size, they are often the most influential. 
20 Leslie C. Levin, The End of Mandatory State Bars?, 109 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 1, 2 (2020), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/georgetown-law-journal/wp-
content/uploads/sites/26/2020/04/Levin_The-End-of-Mandatory-State-Bars.pdf. In some states, less than 
half of the lawyers with offices in the state belong to the voluntary state bar. Id. at 8-9. 
21 See, e.g., id. at 2. In a few of the jurisdictions with mandatory state bars, there are also voluntary state 
bars. See, e.g., About NCBA, N.C. BAR ASS’N, https://www.ncbar.org/about/.  
22 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. 9.010 (2) (2020); WASH. STATE B. ASS’N (Jan. 4, 2021), 
https://www.wsba.org/about-wsba/who-we-are/history-of-the-wsba.  
23 See Levin, supra note 20, at 5-6; Mission, Vision & Core Values, STATE BAR OF ARIZ., 
https://www.azbar.org/about-us/mission-vision-core-values (“The State Bar of Arizona exists to serve and 
protect the public with respect to the provision of legal services and access to justice.”). 
24 These include, inter alia, efforts to educate lawyers about changes in the law, support them in their 
work, and socialize them into the norms of the profession. Id. at 2-3. The exception is California, where in 
2017, the legislature separated the State Bar’s regulatory functions from its other bar functions and 
created a voluntary state bar to perform those other functions. Id. at 17-18. 
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protect the legal profession’s image and to advance its members’ interests. This can sometimes 
be seen in the positions the state bars take with respect to client protection issues. 
 This article looks at the current state of client protection measures in the United States 
and explores why many jurisdictions fail to adequately protect individual clients (and their 
money). It focuses primarily on the ABA’s recommendations concerning client protection 
measures because the ABA has devoted significant attention to these issues and the states often 
follow the ABA’s lead. Part I of the article describes the ABA’s refusal to require in its Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct that most fee agreements be in writing, even though a writing 
requirement would reduce subsequent fee disagreements and opportunities for lawyer 
overreaching. Most states followed the ABA’s approach. Yet when the ABA adopted model 
rules for additional client protection measures, most states declined to implement those measures 
or failed to do so in ways that would truly protect ordinary clients. As explained in Part II, 
virtually all jurisdictions have instituted lawyer-client fee arbitration programs, but in most 
states, lawyer participation in is entirely voluntary, notwithstanding the ABA’s recommendation 
that lawyers be required to participate. Without such a requirement, many clients have no 
meaningful recourse when fee disputes arise. Part III discusses the failure by many jurisdictions 
to follow the ABA’s recommendation that they sufficiently finance their client protection funds 
so that they can fully compensate individuals who have been victimized by overreaching 
lawyers. At the same time, most states have refused to adopt other ABA-recommended client 
protection measures that would help deter lawyer theft, including insurance payee notification 
and random trust account audits. Part IV considers why many jurisdictions have not adopted 
adequate client protection measures. As noted, the answer is sometimes due, in part, to resistance 
by the state bars and acquiescence (or inattention) by the state courts. Somewhat surprisingly, 
notwithstanding mandatory state bars’ claimed commitment to public protection, several 
jurisdictions with mandatory bars have adopted fewer client protection measures than 
jurisdictions with voluntary state bars. The Conclusion discusses the need for closer study to 
better understand why many jurisdictions fail to adopt adequate client protection measures. It 
also suggests that courts need to become more involved in evaluating and improving the states’ 
client protection measures. If courts are unable or unwilling to take needed action, state 
legislatures can and should step in to do so.   
I. THE BAR’S RESISTANCE TO WRITTEN FEE AGREEMENT REQUIREMENTS  
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 The disputes that can arise when there is no written fee agreement sometimes reveal 
profound disagreements between the client and her lawyer. Yet even by 1969, when the ABA 
adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the Disciplinary Rules did not mention 
written fee agreements.25 It did, however, state in an Ethical Consideration that “[i]t is usually 
beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the parties regarding the fee, particularly when 
it is contingent.”26 The singling out of contingent fees may have been due to concerns about 
potential client confusion relating to the calculation of contingent fees. But it seemingly also 
reflected the organized bar’s long-standing disdain for contingent fees and for lawyers who worked 
on that basis.27 
 In the early 1980s, when the ABA’s Commission on Evaluation of Professional 
Standards, chaired by Robert Kutak (“the Kutak Commission”), drafted new Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, its proposed Model Rule 1.5 required written fee agreements when the 
lawyer had not regularly represented the client.28 The Kutak Commission noted that there was 
“universal acknowledgement” that written fee agreements were a good practice and that fee 
disputes were a “major problem” in lawyer-client relations that written agreements could help 
address.29 Nevertheless, at the ABA’s 1982 Annual Meeting of its House of Delegates, the State 
Bar of Michigan proposed an amendment to make written agreements a “preference,” with 
proponents of the amendment voicing “concern that imposing a writing requirement would result 
in disciplinary action against a lawyer who failed to have a written agreement.”30 Proponents of 
the amendment also noted that a written agreement “would not always be needed or desirable, 
and, also, that requiring a writing departed significantly from current practice.”31 Consequently, 
Model Rule 1.5 (b), as adopted, states that “[t]he scope of the representation and the basis or rate 
of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the 
 
25 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).  
26 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19 (1969). 
27 The elite bar associated contingent fees with ethnic lawyers, unprofessional conduct, and “ambulance 
chasers.” See, e.g., JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN 
AMERICA 43-46 (1976); see also MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 246 (1988). 
28 ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, A Legislative History: The Development of the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1982-2005, at 78 (2006) [hereinafter “A Legislative History”]. 
29 See ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Report to the House of Delegates 7 
(June 1982). 
30 A Legislative History, supra note 28, at 79-80. 
31 Id. at 79. 
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client, preferably in writing…except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client 
on the same basis or rate.”32 Model Rule 1.5 (c) provided, however, that contingent fee 
arrangements must be in writing.33 
 In 2001, the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission, which was tasked with reviewing the 
Model Rules,34 again recommended a written fee agreement requirement “except when the 
lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate” or when the total cost 
to the client would be $500 or less.35 It also recommended language stating that “[a]ny changes 
in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in writing.”36 The 
Commission explained, “Few issues between lawyer and client produce more misunderstandings 
and disputes than the fee due the lawyer.”37 It further noted that “the Commission believes that 
the time has come to minimize misunderstandings by requiring the notice to be in writing. . ..”38 
Nevertheless, the Ethics 2000 proposal met resistance in the ABA House of Delegates, which 
voted to restore the “preferably in writing” language to the amended Rule 1.5 it adopted in 
2002.39 
 In some respects, this bar opposition is surprising. Written fee agreements benefit both 
clients and lawyers because they help confirm that there is mutual understanding about fees and 
reduce disputes between the parties. Indeed, bar journals routinely advise lawyers to use written 
fee agreements.40 Lawyer malpractice insurers typically ask lawyers in their insurance 
 
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
33 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
34 The Ethics 2000 Commission was formed in 1997 and submitted its report to the House of Delegates at 
the August 2001 Annual Meeting. Ethics 2000 Commission, ABA, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/. 
35 A Legislative History, supra note 28,  at 88. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 91. 
38 Id.  
39 A Legislative History, supra note 28, at 93. House of Delegates member John Bouma, a prominent 
Arizona attorney and former president of the State Bar of Arizona, proposed to delete the writing 
requirement, and the House of Delegates adopted that amendment. Id. 
40 See, e.g., Jill Schachner Chanen, It’s Not Just About Money: Keeping Fee Disputes to a Minimum Can 
be Key to Reducing Risks of Malpractice Claims and Disciplinary Complaints, ABA J., May 2004, at 44; 
Dawn M. Evans, Practice Tips for Solo and Small-Firm Lawyers, 88 MICH. B. J. 56, 57-58 (2009); Coyt 
Randal Johnston & Robert L. Tobey, The “Best of” Litigation Update 2020: Chapter 11: Legal 
Malpractice, 50 THE ADVOCATE 8 (2010); Edward Poll, Fee “Write-Down” Could Save You 




applications whether they use written fee agreements.41 So why did the ABA House of Delegates 
twice oppose the requirement that fee agreements be in writing? One possible explanation is that 
no one, including lawyers, like to be told what they must do. But this is not entirely convincing, 
because the Model Rules impose other affirmative obligations on lawyers.42 The more likely 
answer is the one offered by the State Bar of Michigan: concern that a writing requirement would 
expose lawyers to disciplinary sanctions if they forget to use one.43  
 Notwithstanding the ABA’s rejection of a requirement in Model Rule 1.5 that most fee 
agreements be in writing, fourteen jurisdictions now impose that requirement.44 Several of them 
follow the Ethics 2000 Commission’s recommendation and only impose a writing requirement 
when the fee exceeds a low dollar amount.45 State bar associations sometimes actively opposed 
 
41 See Leslie C. Levin, Regulators at the Margins: The Impact of Malpractice Insurers on Solo and Small 
Firm Lawyers, 49 CONN. L. REV. 553, 570 (2016). 
42 One such obligation concerns the requirement to place client money in a trust account, including 
advance fees. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (a), (c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
43 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Stephen Gillers suggests a third possible explanation, which 
is that a lack of clarity about fees may benefit lawyers, especially with individual clients who are unlikely 
to have the resources to go to court and fight over fees. See Gillers, supra note 5, at 403-405. It seems 
unlikely, however, that the House of Delegates members were quite so calculating. 
44 These jurisdictions are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, 
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
Jurisdictional Rules Comparison Charts Model Rule 1.5 (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_5.pdf. 
45 The thresholds range from $250-$3000. See, e.g., HAW. RULE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.5 (b) 
($250); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §1215.2 (a) ($3000); Jurisdictional Rules Comparison 
Charts Model Rule 1.5, supra note 44. 
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efforts to impose these writing requirements.46 More than thirty-five jurisdictions follow Model 
Rule 1.5 (b) and do not require written fee agreements for most fee arrangements.47  
 In jurisdictions that do not require written fee agreements, a significant minority of 
lawyers do not use them. Surveys of lawyers in Iowa and Oklahoma indicated that at least 17% 
did not routinely put their fee agreements in writing.48 When fee arrangements are not reduced to 
writing, individual clients are at a disadvantage. It is harder for clients to secure the return of 
unearned fees and it is easier for lawyers to try overcharge their clients.49 When fee disputes of 
any sort arise, individual clients have limited options.   
II. THE LIMITS OF FEE DISPUTE ARBITRATION PROGRAMS 
 Fee disputes between lawyers and clients are not uncommon.50 They occur for many 
reasons including misunderstandings about how the lawyer’s fees and expenses would be 
 
46 For example, a New Jersey Supreme Court appointed task force recommended in 1983 that New Jersey 
follow the Kutak Commission’s earlier draft of the Model Rules, requiring that fee agreements be in 
writing. Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, N.J. L.J., July 28, 1983, at 1. The voluntary New Jersey State Bar Association subsequently 
argued (unsuccessfully) to the Supreme Court that the Court should adopt the ABA’s Model Rule 1.5 (b) 
with its “preferably in writing” language, claiming that a writing requirement “would impose onerous 
burdens on lawyers.” Letter from New Jersey State Bar Association to the New Jersey Supreme Court 4 
(Nov. 29, 1983) (on file with author). Likewise, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a broad 
written fee agreement requirement, it was propounded by Daniel W. Hildebrand, who served as 
Wisconsin’s Ethics 2000 Committee chair, but opposed by the State Bar of Wisconsin. See David Ziemer, 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Tentatively Mandates Written Fee Agreements, WIS. L.J., March 8, 2006; 
Daniel W. Hildebrand, Ethics 2000: Understanding Proposed Changes to Professional Conduct Rules, 
WIS. LAW., Nov. 2004. See also Dubin, supra note 5, at 98 (describing opposition to a writing 
requirement by the State Bar of Michigan and its members). In Hawaii, however, the mandatory Hawaii 
State Bar Association took no position on the issue. See E-mail from Iris M. Ito, Assistant Exec. Dir., 
Haw. State Bar Ass’n, to Adam Mackie, Reference Librarian, University of Conn. Law Library (May 10, 
2021, 10:09 EDT) (on file with author). 
47 Jurisdictional Rules Comparison Charts Model Rule 1.5, supra note 44. 
48 See, e.g., Oklahoma Bar Ass’n Membership Survey 12 (2013), http://docplayer.net/10571183-
Oklahoma-bar-association.html; Iowa State Bar Association, 2015 Salary & Economic Survey 71 (2015),  
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iowabar.org/resource/resmgr/reports/2015_economic_survey.pdf. 
49 For some examples of lawyer overreaching where was no written fee agreement, see Iowa Supreme 
Court Atty. Disciplinary Bd. v. Vandel, 889 N.W.2d 659, 667-68 (Iowa 2017); Joy v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 614 
S.W.3d 496 (Ky. 2021); In re Delorme, 795 N.W.2d 293 (N.D. 2011); Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Burton, 482 
P.3d 739 (Okla. 2021); McDonnell Dyer P.L.C. v. Select-O-Hits, W2000-00044-COA-R3-CV, 2001 
Tenn. App. 272, *1 (Ct. App. Tenn. Apr. 20, 2001). 
50 It is hard to determine precisely how often fee disputes arise. See Alan Scott Rau, Resolving Disputes 
Over Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2005, 2005-06 (1993). Disciplinary authorities report that 
they are called upon by clients to become  involved in fee disputes “frequently.” See, e.g., Christina 
Pazzanese, Mass. Supreme Judicial Court to Consider Mandatory Fee Arbitration, MASS. LAW. 
WEEKLY, Feb. 17, 2011. One survey of Texas lawyers revealed that 31% reported they had five or more 
fee disputes over the preceding five years. See Rau, supra at 2007.  
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calculated or what the work would ultimately cost, a failure to return unearned fees, other lawyer 
overreaching, and client unhappiness with the results.51 When fee disagreements arise, lawyers 
will sometimes “eat” their fees,52 clients will sometimes pay (unhappily), or the parties may 
reach a compromise. When informal dispute resolution does not occur, lawyers may use 
collection agencies,53 clients may file a discipline complaint, or a lawsuit may ensue. Fee 
arbitration is often a better alternative for both parties for the reasons described below.  
A. A Brief History of Fee Dispute Arbitration 
 The legal profession has long counseled lawyers against suing clients for fees.54 These 
lawsuits make both the lawyer and the profession look bad. The ABA’s 1908 Canons of 
Professional Ethics urged that “controversies with clients concerning compensation are to be 
avoided” and that lawsuits against clients “should be resorted to only to prevent injustice, 
imposition or fraud.”55 The 1969 ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility echoed this 
view.56 The conventional wisdom among lawyers also holds that lawsuits for fees will provoke 
clients to counterclaim for malpractice or file a disciplinary complaint in response.57   
 
51 For some additional reasons why fee disputes can occur, see Rau, supra note 50, at 2005-06. 
52 Surveys of lawyers in eight jurisdictions in 2005-2006 revealed that a significant percentage of lawyers 
report that about 9-10% of their billed fees are uncollectible. See Paul F. Teich, Are Lawyers Truly 
Greedy? An Analysis of Relevant Empirical Evidence, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 837, 882-84 (2013). 
See also Oklahoma Bar Ass’n Membership Survey, supra note 48, at 17 (reporting that more than 38% of 
surveyed Oklahoma lawyers replied that their firm failed to collect 10% or more of their fees); Olabisis 
Onisile Whitney & Rick DeBruhl, Attorney Survey: Arizona Lawyers Report on Economics of Practice, 
ARIZ. ATTORNEY, Sept. 2016, at 22 (reporting that 30% of lawyers surveyed failed to collect 10% or 
more of their fees); State Bar of Michigan, 2020 Economics of Law Practice in Michigan 21, 
https://www.michbar.org/file/pmrc/articles/0000156.pdf (reporting that almost 24% of responding 
lawyers indicated that 10% of more of their fees were uncollectible). 
53 See Iowa State Bar Association, supra note 48, at 79; see also Teich, supra note 52, at 880-81. 
54 In 1860, George Sharswood recommended against suing clients for fees except in extraordinary 
circumstances. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 151 (2d ed. 1860); see also 
Teich, supra note 52, at 885. 
55 See ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS 14 (1908). 
56 See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-23 (1969) (stating that a lawyer “should be 
zealous in his efforts to avoid controversy over fees with clients and … should not sue a client for a fee 
unless necessary to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client”). 
57 See, e.g., Stephen M. Blumberg, Risk Management: Preventing Malpractice Claims, LAW PRACTICE, 
Sept. 1987, at 52; Emily Eichenhorn, To Sue or Not to Sue: Is the Pursuit of Unpaid Fees Worth the Risk 
of Litigation?, 66 OR. ST. B. BULL. 29  (2006); Glenn Machado, Money Matters: Make Sure You’re 
Handling Your Clients’ Dollars with Sense, NEV. LAW., Oct. 2014, at 20. 
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 In the late 1920s, the organized bar began to institute voluntary fee arbitration 
programs.58 One important reason was to avoid “the public airing of fee disputes.”59 By the 
1960s, several local bar associations offered voluntary fee dispute resolution to lawyers and 
clients.60 One commentator observed at that time that the profession, the attorney, and clients 
would benefit from arbitration in the following ways: 
 The profession because such a procedure would provide a fair and equitable resolution of 
 the dispute without attendant publicity—the attorney because those best qualified to 
 evaluate his services would pass upon his charges—and the client because he would be 
 afforded a speedy remedy without cost to him.61 
The outcomes of fee dispute resolution during this period generally favored lawyers.62 
 Throughout this time, disciplinary authorities viewed most attorney-client fee disputes as 
being outside their jurisdiction.63 In 1970, when the ABA’s Special Committee on Evaluation of 
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement issued its report, it noted that the failure to address these 
disputes affected the public’s perception of the bar and recommended procedures to deal with 
ordinary fee disputes (i.e., those that did not involve “overreaching”).64 It suggested that 
procedures for arbitrating fee disputes be handled outside the bar associations to avoid the 
conclusion that “a group of attorneys is protecting one of its own.”65 In 1974, another ABA 
committee issued a report devoted to fee dispute resolution and noted the increasing problem that 
lawyers would not voluntarily participate in the fee arbitration process, but did not recommend 
that lawyers be required to do so.66  
 Nevertheless, that same year, Alaska became the first state to adopt a state-wide fee 
arbitration program in which lawyers—but not clients—were required to participate (“mandatory 
 
58 In 1928, the Los Angeles County Bar Association became the first bar association to establish a 
Committee on Arbitration. George E. Bodle, The Arbitration of Fee Disputes Between Attorney and 
Clients, L.A. B. BULL., June 1963, at 265, 265. 
59 Id.  
60 See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT: 
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 189 (1970).   
61 Bodle, supra note 58, at 265. 
62 Id. 
63 SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 60, at 186, 188. 
64  See id. at 1, 186, 189. 
65 Id. at 189. 
66 Rau, supra note 50, at 2021. It further noted that “there was little likelihood” that mandatory arbitration 
would gain support. Id. 
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fee arbitration”).67 A few other states subsequently adopted state-wide voluntary or mandatory 
fee arbitration programs.68 The 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct encouraged 
lawyers to participate in fee dispute resolution even when it is not mandatory.69 In 1992, the 
ABA’s Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (“the McKay Commission”), 
which had been formed to review state lawyer discipline enforcement throughout the country, 
recommended fee arbitration as one of the procedures that could be used in lieu of discipline for 
minor misconduct.70  
 In 1995, the ABA adopted Model Rules for Fee Arbitration based on the experience in 
six states that had instituted mandatory fee arbitration.71 The model rules provide that the state’s 
highest court shall appoint a Fee Arbitration Commission to administer the program and that 
one-third of the commissioners shall be nonlawyers.72 They further state that fee arbitration 
should be mandatory for lawyers if arbitration is commenced by the client.73 Lawyers are 
required to notify the client of the availability of the fee arbitration program before or at the time 
that the lawyer commences litigation to recover fees.74 If the client seeks fee arbitration within 
thirty days, the litigation will be stayed.75 The rules also provide that disputes exceeding $7500 
are to be decided by three panel arbitrators, including one nonlawyer. Where the disputed 
amount is lower, the model rules provide that there should be a single lawyer arbitrator.76 Fee 
 
67 See OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF N.J., 2019 STATE OF THE ATTORNEY 
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM REPORT 43 (2020), 
https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/oae/2019oaeannualrpt.pdf; 2006 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration 
Programs Part II- Chart 1 (2007), ABA, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/clientpro_migra
ted/Fee_Arb_Chart_2_Part_1.pdf.  
68 For example, Oregon began its voluntary fee arbitration program in 1976 and Maine and New Jersey 
adopted mandatory programs in 1978. See 2006 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration Programs Part II- Chart 
I, supra note 67. 
69 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating that if a 
voluntary fee arbitration or mediation procedure has been established for fee disputes “the lawyer should 
conscientiously consider submitting to it”). 
70 LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY: REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF 
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, Recommendation 1, 48 (1992). 
71 See MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N 1995); A History of the Client 
Protection Rules, ABA, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/client_protection/history/.  
72 MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION R. 2. 
73 MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION R. 1(3). 
74 MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION  R. 1 cmt. 
75 MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION R. 1 (7). 
76 MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION R. 3. 
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arbitration is confidential and is binding for all parties if they have agreed in writing to be bound 
by it.77 Even if a party (usually the lawyer) has not agreed to be bound, the party will be bound if 
a trial de novo is not sought within thirty days after the decision is served.78 Participation in fee 
arbitration does not preclude the client from filing a disciplinary complaint.79  
B. Current Fee Arbitration Programs 
 Although there are fee arbitration programs in virtually every state,80 not all have 
statewide programs. Contrary to the ABA model rules’ recommendation, most of these programs 
are administered by bar associations.81 Only ten jurisdictions make arbitration mandatory for 
lawyers if the client seeks it.82 In those jurisdictions, the requirement was imposed by statute or 
court rule.83 Georgia does not make arbitration mandatory, but it places pressure on lawyers to 
arbitrate fee disputes by providing that if the lawyer refuses to arbitrate, the arbitration can still 
go forward, and “the award rendered will be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of 
the award in any action brought to enforce the award.”84 Clients can be compelled to submit to 
 
77 MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION R.1(4), 8. 
78 MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION R. 1(4). 
79 MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION R. 1 cmt.  
80 Arkansas and North Carolina are the exceptions. See 2016 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration Programs.  
81 It appears that only Maine and a few other jurisdictions have fee arbitration programs that are entirely 
independent of their states’ bar organizations. See, e.g., Fee Disputes, ME. BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE 
BAR, https://mebaroverseers.org/regulation/bar_rules.html?id=638765. Along with Maine, Michigan and 
New Jersey house their fee arbitration programs within their disciplinary systems. See id.; MICH. CT. R. 
9.130 (A) (2020); Office of Attorney Ethics, N.J. COURTS, https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/oae.html. In 
some areas of New York, the program is handled by voluntary bar associations and in others, it is 
administered by the Administrative Judge’s Office. See NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY CLIENT FEE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE 
COURTS 12-13, https://www.nycourts.gov/legacyPDFs/admin/feedispute/Annual-Report-2019.pdf. 
82 The jurisdictions are Alaska, California, District of Columbia, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, South Carolina and Wyoming. See ABA Standing Comm. on Client Protection, State-by-
State Adoption of ABA Client Protection Programs (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/state_by_state_
cp_programs.pdf. In addition, North Carolina requires lawyers to participate in mediation but if no 
agreement can be reached, the client must go to court. See 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 1D §§ .0707, .0708 
(2020); Harry B. Warren, New Dispute Resolution Rules, Good-bye Nonbinding Arbitration, N.C. ST. B. 
J., Fall 2000, at 28, 29. 
83 See 2006 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration Programs, Chart II-Part 1, supra note 68; N.Y.C.R.R. Part 
137 (2020).  
84 The burden of proof shifts to the lawyer to prove otherwise. See GA. BAR R. 6-410, 6-417 (2020). 
Nevada makes arbitration mandatory for a lawyer if, during the preceding two years, the attorney has 
been the subject of three or more fee disputes within the Committee’s jurisdiction. STATE BAR OF NEV. 
ARBITRATION COMMITTEE RULES OF PROCEDURE (IV)(B)(2) (2017), 
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fee arbitration in some jurisdictions if their lawyers included a fee arbitration clause with 
adequate disclosure in their engagement agreements.85 Some jurisdictions set minimum amounts 
on fee disputes that can be subject to fee arbitration.86 As recommended by the ABA, most 
jurisdictions’ fee arbitration programs provide for two lawyer arbitrators and one non-lawyer 
arbitrator to decide larger disputes.87 The arbitration process is free or offered at a low cost to 
both parties.88 Several jurisdictions also offer mediation of fee disputes.89 
 Why would a jurisdiction not require mandatory fee arbitration? After all, fee arbitration 
has advantages for both lawyers and clients because it is faster, cheaper, and more private than 




85 See, e.g., Ober v. Mozingo, No. D038616, 2002 WL 432544, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2002); 
Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP v. Forier, 67 So. 3d 315, 319 (Fla. Ct. App. 2011); 
Innovative Images, LLC v. Sommerville, 848 S.E.2d 75, 79-81 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020); Hodges v. 
Reasonover, 103 So. 3d 1069, 1077 (La. 2012 ).  In 2002, the ABA issued a Formal Opinion which 
concluded it was permissible to include in a retainer agreement a provision requiring a client to submit to 
binding arbitration of fee disputes, but stated that the lawyer must explain the implications of binding 
arbitration to the extent necessary for the client to make an “informed decision” before signing the 
agreement. See ABA Committee on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 02-425 (2002). 
86 See, e.g., Fee Arbitration Program, STATE BAR OF N.M., https://www.sbnm.org/For-Public/I-Have-a-
Dispute-with-My-Lawyer/Dispute-a-Lawyers-Fee (establishing a $1000 minimum for arbitration). 
87 The Los Angeles Country Bar Association is on the high end and will only provide three arbitrators if 
the dispute exceeds $25,000. Mandatory Fee Arbitration Approved Programs, STATE BAR OF CAL., 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Attorney-Regulation/Mandatory-Fee-Arbitration/Approved-
Programs. In most jurisdictions, the threshold amount for three arbitrators is substantially lower. 
88 See, e.g., Fee Dispute Resolution Program, VA. STATE BAR,  https://www.vsb.org/site/public/fee-
dispute-resolution-program (stating that petitioner pays a one-time $20 fee and the other party pays no 
administrative fees). 
89 See, e.g., Attorney Fee Disputes, ALASKA BAR ASS’N, https://alaskabar.org/for-the-public/attorney-fee-
disputes/; DC Bar, Information Sheet on the Fee Arbitration Service, 
https://www.dcbar.org/getmedia/3ee82b36-fcca-4690-b734-7e510871e6cd/ACAB-Fee-Arbitration-
Filing-Packet; Fee Dispute Resolution Program, OR. STATE BAR, 
https://www.osbar.org/feedisputeresolution. 
90 See John Leubsdorf, Against Lawyer Retaining Liens, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 849, 873-74 (2004). For 
discussion of some additional disadvantages of litigation, see Rau, supra note 50, at 2016-18. 
91 See, e.g., In re LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268 (N.J. 1981) (rejecting New Jersey Bar Association’s argument 
that mandatory fee arbitration was unconstitutional); Marilyn Lindgren Cohen, Mandatory Fee 
Arbitration: Is it the Wave of the Future?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 1994, at 33, 34 (describing reasons why 
Oregon State Bar Board of Governors did not support mandatory arbitration for lawyers); Dara McLeod, 
Virginia State Bar Panel Rejects Mandatory Fee Dispute Resolution, VA. LAW. WEEKLY, Dec. 6, 2004 
(describing State Bar task force’s rejection of mandatory mediation); Pazzanese, supra note 50 
(describing opposition to mandatory arbitration by Massachusetts bar organizations); Gary Spencer, 
Matrimonial Rules Delayed for Changes; Presiding Justices to Weigh Criticisms, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 28, 
1993, at 8 (describing “uniform opposition among bar groups” to proposed mandatory fee arbitration 
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believe that low-cost or free fee dispute arbitration programs make it too easy for clients to 
dispute their fees and to delay or avoid payment.92 They argue that mandatory arbitration would 
cause lawyers to require most of their fees up front, resulting in fewer clients who could retain 
lawyers, or that it would force lawyers to write off more of their fees.93 Lawyers have claimed—
less persuasively—that they do not want to be deprived of a jury trial.94 Lawyers also argue that 
mandatory fee arbitration would “create[e] more reasons to be disciplined” because arbitrators 
would be considering the reasonableness of fees under the rules of professional conduct.95  
 Washington’s experience illustrates how lawyers can thwart efforts to adopt mandatory 
fee arbitration programs. The mandatory Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) first 
adopted a voluntary fee arbitration program in the mid-1970s.96 In 1995, the WSBA and a 
Washington Supreme Court Task Force on Lawyer Discipline produced a joint report with 
recommendations including that Washington institute a mandatory fee arbitration program.97 
Regulators reported that “55% of the time the lawyer decline[d] to arbitrate fee disputes, leaving 
[clients] frustrated.”98 In 1996, the WSBA’s Board of Governors approved, in concept, a 
proposal to implement such a fee program.99 A WSBA committee then developed draft rules to 
implement the new program and the Washington State Bar News reported these developments in 
August 1997. The Board of Governors anticipated taking final action the following month, but 
invited interested parties to share their views with the WSBA.100 At the Board of Governor’s 
September meeting, they described feedback from lawyers as “a firestorm,” with lawyers 
 
program in New York); David Ziemer, WI Supreme Court Addresses Ethics, Fee Arbitration, WIS. L.J., 
Dec. 25, 2002 (describing “strong opposition amongst the bar” to mandatory fee arbitration). 
92 See, e.g., Stephen T. Charmick, Letter to the Editor, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, July 1998, at 9; Steven A. 
Hemmett, Letter to Editor, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, July 1998, at 7-8; Terry Lee, It Aint Broke So What Are 
We Fixing: An Argument Against Mandatory Fee Arbitration, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, May 1998, at 25. 
93 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 92, at 25; Hemmet, supra note 92, at 7-8. 
94 See, e.g., In re LiVolsi, 428 A.2d at 1273. It is unclear why a lawyer would prefer that a fee dispute be 
decided by a jury rather than a panel composed primarily of peers. 
95 Lee, supra note 92, at 25. 
96 The Board’s Work, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Aug-Sept. 1974, at 14. 
97 Lindsay T. Thompson, Refining Lawyer Discipline: A Multifaceted Approach, WASH. ST. B. NEWS 15, 
19 (Aug. 1995).  
98 See Barbara Harper & Randy Beitel, Fee Arbitration to be Mandatory When Requested by a Client, 
WASH. STATE B. NEWS, Aug. 1997, at 37. 
99 Barrie Althoff & Randy Beitel, Governors Restructure Attorney Discipline, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, April 
1996, at 35-36; M. Wayne Blair & Marijean E. Moscetto, Fee Arbitration: An Update on Revisions to the 
Proposal & and an Argument in Support, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, May 1998, at 24, 24. 
100 Harper & Beitel, supra note 98, at 39. 
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complaining the proposed rule was being “loaded in favor of consumers.”101 The Board of 
Governors decided to table discussion so that more WSBA members could weigh in.102 The 
lawyers’ responses that followed were largely negative.103 Even after many revisions of the 
proposed rule, there was “overwhelming negative reaction from [WSBA] members.”104 The 
Board of Governors voted in June 1998 “to put a stake through the heart” of the proposal and to 
cease to consider mandatory fee arbitration.105 
 The voluntary fee arbitration programs that are found in most jurisdictions today vary in 
certain notable respects. Some jurisdictions have state-wide fee arbitration programs established 
by court rule and administered by the state bar.106 In other jurisdictions these programs were 
established and are entirely run by the state bar.107 Some states with large lawyer populations 
such as Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas have no state-wide programs and voluntary fee dispute 
resolution programs are only offered through local bar associations.108 A few programs use no 
non-lawyer arbitrators, or use only a single lawyer-arbitrator, even for higher value fee 
disputes.109  
 How easy is it for clients to learn about the availability of fee arbitration when a fee 
dispute arises? It really depends. New York requires lawyers to advise clients in writing of the 
availability of fee arbitration when a fee dispute cannot be resolved.110 Some other jurisdictions 
 
101 Annual Meeting and September 11-12 Board of Governors Meeting, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Oct. 1997, at 
40. One governor stated that the rule was “too volatile in its current form.” Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See Letters to the Editor, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Oct. 1997, at 8-11; The Board’s Work, WASH. ST. B. 
NEWS, Nov. 1997, at 31. 
104 President’s Report, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Sept. 1998, at 33.   
105 Id.; see also Sherrie Bennett, The Board’s Work, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, July 1998, at 33. 
106 Kentucky, Nevada, and Utah are examples. See, e.g., 2006 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration Programs, 
Chart II-Part I, supra note 68. 
107 See id. 
108 See e.g., See How to Submit a Request for Investigation, ARDC OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 
https://www.iardc.org/htr_otherinfoprov.html; FAQs – Public, PA. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.pabar.org/site/For-the-Public/FAQs-and-Legal-Links/FAQ; Resolving Fee Disputes, STATE 
BAR OF TEX., 
https://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/ForThePublic/ProblemswithanAttorney/ResolvingFe
eDisagreements/default.htm. 
109 States that exclusively use lawyer-arbitrators include Colorado, Mississippi, Oregon, and Rhode 
Island. See 2016 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration Programs, supra note 80; 2006 ABA Survey of Fee 
Arbitration Programs (2007), Chart V-Part 1, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/clientpro_migra
ted/Fee_Arb_Chart_5_Part_1.pdf. 
110 See N.Y. RULES OF CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE 137.6 (a)(1) (2021). 
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do a good job of informing the public of the availability of fee arbitration in places where clients 
are likely to look, such as lawyer disciplinary agency and bar association websites.111 But in 
other jurisdictions, it is more difficult for clients to learn about fee arbitration programs. The 
Mississippi State Bar website states that its Fee Dispute Resolution Committee has established 
procedures to handle disputes, but does not explain how to contact the Committee.112 Even after 
searching the North Dakota Bar’s website, I was unable to determine that North Dakota had a fee 
dispute resolution program without writing to the State Bar to confirm that it had one. The 
District of Columbia’s Attorney/Client Arbitration Board reports that “public awareness about 
the program” is its biggest challenge.113 
 It can be even more challenging to learn additional information about most fee arbitration 
programs. (The term “black hole” comes to mind.) The ABA Committee on Client Protection 
periodically surveys states to obtain information about their programs, but its most recent survey 
only yielded responses from ten jurisdictions and one local bar association.114 Some information 
about fee arbitration programs can be gleaned if jurisdictions publish reports,115 but most 
 
111 See, e.g., FAQ/Fee Arbitration, STATE BAR OF GA., 
https://www.gabar.org/aboutthebar/faq/faqs.cfm?filter=Fee%20Arbitration; Lawyer Fee Dispute 
Resolution, LA. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.lsba.org/Public/FeeDisputeResolution.aspx. A few of the 
websites provide helpful brochures that explain the process. See, e.g., Va. State Bar, Fee Dispute 
Resolution Program, https://www.vsb.org/docs/fee-dispute-brochure.pdf . 
112 The website refers the reader to the Committee rules, but those rules do not explain how to contact the 
Committee. See The Program, MISS. BAR, https://www.msbar.org/ethics-discipline/fee-disputes/the-
program/#:~:text=The%20Fee%20Dispute%20Resolution%20Committee,It%20is%20a%20free%20prog
ram. In addition, the Mississippi Bar’s Frequently Asked Questions about problems with an attorney make 
no reference to fee disputes. See Frequently Asked Questions, MISS. BAR, https://www.msbar.org/ethics-
discipline/disciplinary-process/frequently-asked-questions/. 
113 2016 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration Programs, supra note 80. 
114 Id. One of the ten reporting jurisdictions was Arkansas, which had no fee dispute resolution program. 
115 While a few jurisdictions provide detailed information about their arbitration programs, most only 
indicate the number of matters filed or disposed of during the year. See ALASKA BAR ASSOCIATION 2018 
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2019), https://alaskabar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018-annual-report-1.pdf; 2019-20 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY/CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR  
(2020); STATE BAR OF GA., BOG BOARD BOOK, ANNUAL MEETING 2020, at 84-87, 
https://www.gabar.org/committeesprogramssections/boardofgovernors/upload/AM20_Boardbook.pdf; 
BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 5, 
https://www.mebaroverseers.org/about/pdf/2018%20Annual%20Report.pdf ; STATE BAR OF NEVADA, 
ANNUAL REPORT 2020, at 4, https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/SBN-2020-Annual-Report.pdf; 
N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE RESOLUTION PROGRAM 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, 
https://www.nycourts.gov/legacyPDFs/admin/feedispute/Annual-Report-2019.pdf; OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF N.J., supra note 67, at 43. When contacted 
directly, some fee arbitration programs also provided annual statistics. 
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jurisdictions do not do so. The limited data reveal substantial differences in the extent to which 
fee arbitration is utilized. Comparisons are difficult because the jurisdictions report their data 
differently, but Georgia’s program appears to be the most active, with approximately 98 new 
disputes reported every month during the period 2019-20 and about 25 hearings scheduled 
monthly.116 New Jersey received 796 matters in 2019117 while New York closed 770 matters.118 
Yet only forty-five fee arbitration disputes were filed in the District of Columbia in 2019, which 
was similar to the number of filings received in Maine.119 While the Los Angeles County Bar 
Association’s mandatory fee arbitration program receives 200-300 fee arbitration requests each 
year, the Chicago Bar Association’s voluntary program received 67 fee complaints in 2019.120 
Family and criminal matters generate the most fee arbitration requests.121 Real estate/landlord 
tenant and litigation matters also account for a significant number of the requests.122  
 The disputes in mandatory arbitration jurisdictions involved meaningful amounts when 
considering that the clients were mostly individuals. In New York, the average amount in dispute 
 
116 BOG BOARD BOOK, supra note 115, at 84-85. 
117 OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF N.J., supra note 67, at 46. The description 
in this paragraph focuses on the period 2019 or 2019-20, depending on how the jurisdiction reported data, 
because the disputes and dispositions were likely affected by COVID-19. 
118 N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE RESOLUTION PROGRAM 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115,  
at 4. The fact that New York, with a larger lawyer population than New Jersey, has roughly the same 
number of cases may be explained, in part, by the fact that New York excludes criminal matters from its 
mandatory fee arbitration program. See N.Y. RULES OF CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE §137.1 (b)(2) (2021). 
119 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY/CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD OF THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA BAR, supra note 115, at 4; BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 115, at 5. 
120 See E-mail from Sharon McLawyer, Dir., LACBA Attorney Client Mediation and Arbitration 
Services, to Maryanne Daly-Doran, Reference Librarian, Univ. of Conn. Law Library (July 6, 2021, 
19:55 EDT); Chicago Bar Association Professional Fees Committee Statistics (on file with author) 
121 2016 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration Programs, supra note 80; 2006 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration 
Programs, Chart IV, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/clientpro_migra
ted/Fee_Arb_Chart_4.pdf; OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF N.J., supra note 
67, at 47 (reporting that matrimonial cases generated 32% of all matters in New Jersey); NEW YORK 
STATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE COURTS, supra note 115, at 9 (reporting that family matters constituted 
the majority of cases handled). In the District of Columbia, however, employment/EEO matters gave rise 
to the most fee arbitration matters. 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY/CLIENT ARBITRATION 
BOARD OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR 5, supra note 115, at 172-73. 
122 N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE RESOLUTION PROGRAM 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, 
at 9; OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF N.J., supra note 67, at 47-48; 2016 ABA 
Survey of Fee Arbitration Programs, supra note 80; 2006 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration Programs, 
Chart IV, supra note 121. 
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in 2019 was $17,432.123 In Georgia, the average amount in controversy was $15,155.124 Clients 
made more than eighty of the requests for arbitration in New York, while clients made sixty 
percent of the requests in the District of Columbia.125 In some jurisdictions lawyers 
disproportionately obtained awards while in others the clients were favored.126 The reasons for 
these differences remain to be explored.  
 What seems clear, however, is that the voluntary fee arbitration programs in most of the 
jurisdictions are insufficient to address the needs of individual clients. These programs are more 
likely to be bar-created and bar run, with limited or no accountability to the courts. In some large 
jurisdictions, voluntary fee dispute arbitration is handled by local bar associations and is not 
available in all parts of the state.127 Lawyers can refuse to participate in voluntary arbitration 
programs —and many do.128 The number of lawyers who decline to participate—like so much 
else about voluntary programs—is not known. When lawyers refuse to participate in fee 
arbitration, clients have little recourse except litigation, which is frequently not a real option. It is 
often not economically feasible for individual clients to hire another lawyer and pay the litigation 
costs associated with resolving fee disputes. Disciplinary agencies typically decline to consider 
these complaints.129 Thus, clients in these states are often left with no viable recourse when fee 
disputes arise. 
 
123 N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE RESOLUTION PROGRAM 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, 
at 4. 
124 BOG BOARD BOOK, supra note 115, at 85-86. Of course, the amounts in dispute were probably lower 
in jurisdictions where attorneys’ fees are generally lower, but most other jurisdictions did not report this 
information. 
125 Id. at 4; N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE RESOLUTION PROGRAM 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 115, at 17. 
126 In the District of Columbia in 2019-20, in 12 out of 20 awards, lawyers were the prevailing party. 
2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY/CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD OF THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA BAR, supra note 115, at 7. Likewise in Maine, dispositions favored attorneys by a two-to-one 
ratio. MAINE 2018 BOARD OF OVERSEERS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, a 5 (reporting that hearing 
panel found in favor of lawyers in 19 matters and in favor of clients in 6). In contrast, in only 
approximately one-third of the New Jersey cases in 2019, did the hearing panels uphold the attorneys’ 
fees in full. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF N.J., supra note 67, at 46. In the 
balance, they reduced the attorneys’ fees by 28.4% of the total billings that were subject to reductions. Id. 
127 For example, in Illinois, where local bar associations handle fee arbitration matters, there are some 
county bar associations that do not offer fee arbitration. See How to Submit a Request for Investigation, 
supra note 108. 
128 See, e.g., 2016 ABA Survey of Fee Arbitration, supra note 80 (reporting that 80% of lawyers declined 
to arbitrate clients’ disputes in Mississippi). 
129 See, e.g., Louisiana Attorney Discipline Board, 
https://www.ladb.org/docs/Publication/LADBBrochure.pdf (“Fee disputes are not normally handled 
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III. THE INADEQUACY OF MEASURES TO ADDRESS LAWYER THEFT 
 Lawyer theft of client money has been a longstanding problem for the legal profession.130 
Lawyers steal from client trust accounts; pocket insurance settlement checks, payments received 
in connection with real estate closings or the proceeds of estates; or refuse to refund unearned 
fees. When they steal, they often victimize more than one client.131 States’ rules of professional 
conduct contain detailed provisions for how lawyers are to safeguard client money,132 but those 
rules have not prevented a small number of lawyers from stealing from their clients.   
 Forty years ago, the ABA began to adopt model rules for client protection measures that 
were directly aimed at addressing lawyer thefts.133 The first was the Model Rules for Client 
Security Funds, but the states’ funds often fail to cover all of victims’ losses.134 The ABA also 
adopted model rules requiring financial institutions to notify lawyer disciplinary authorities when 
an overdraft occurs in a client trust account.135 Most states have also adopted this measure,136 yet 
it only detects defalcations when the lawyer has completely emptied a trust account. The ABA 
subsequently recommended additional client protection measures, including its Model Rule for 
Payee Notification and Model Rules for Random Audit of Trust Accounts, but most jurisdictions 
have not adopted these measures.137 The net effect is that many states fail to adequately protect 
individual clients from overreaching lawyers. 
 
within the lawyer discipline system.”); Lawyer Disciplinary Board FAQ, W. VA. STATE BAR, 
https://wvbar.org/public-information/lawyer-disciplinary-board-faq/ (stating that “[f]ee matters ordinarily 
are not a basis for discipline of a lawyer”). 
130 See, e.g., James R. Devine, Lawyer Discipline in Missouri: Is a New Ethics Code Necessary, 46 MO. 
L. REV. 709, 714 (1981) (describing 1825 Missouri statute permitting disbarment of lawyers convicted of 
a felony for retaining his client’s money after the client demanded its return). 
131 See, e.g., David W. Leefe, Client Assistance Fund, Compensating for Lawyer Misdeeds, Repairing the 
Negative Image, LA. B. J., June/July 2002, at 32, 34.  
132 See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (2021). 
133 A History of the Client Protection Rules, supra note 71. 
134 See MODEL RULES FOR CLIENT SECURITY FUNDS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1981); infra notes 157-61, 174 and 
accompanying text. 
135 A History of the Client Protection Rules, supra note 71; MODEL RULES FOR TRUST ACCOUNT 
OVERDRAFT NOTIFICATION (AM. BAR ASS’N 1988). 
136 Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 42. 
137 The ABA also recommends one other measure to protect client money from misappropriation, which 
is standards for maintaining client trust account records. See ABA MODEL RULE ON FINANCIAL 
RECORDKEEPING (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993). Some states require certification of compliance with the 
jurisdiction’s recordkeeping rules. See Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra 
note 1, at  42-43. Unfortunately, certification measures seem unlikely to prevent a lawyer who wishes to 
steal client money from doing so. 
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 1. Client Protection Funds  
 When lawyers steal client money, the money is usually gone before the theft is detected. 
Malpractice insurance does not cover these losses138 and lawyers who steal often have no other 
money with which to repay their victims.139 Even if the lawyers are ordered to make restitution, 
they may be unable to do so because they are disbarred or imprisoned (or both). Thus, the only 
way that some clients can recover any of their money is by making a claim to a jurisdiction’s 
client protection fund.  
 In 1981, when the ABA first adopted Model Rules for Client Security Funds (later 
renamed the Model Rules for Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection), most jurisdictions already 
had established some form of client protection fund.140 The purpose of the funds—from the 
organized bar’s perspective—is to preserve the public’s trust in the integrity of the legal 
profession.141 The ABA’s model rules provide that the funds should be established under the 
supervision of the state’s highest court and be part of the jurisdiction’s lawyer regulation 
system.142 They further state that client protection funds should reimburse failures “to refund 
unearned fees received in advance” as well as “theft or embezzlement of money or the wrongful 
taking or conversion” of money or property.143 The model rules contemplate that the funds will 
“fully reimburse losses”144 and provide for the state supreme court to provide for funding by 
lawyers “in amounts adequate for the proper payment of claims.”145 In an apparent compromise 
 
138 See Susan Saab Fortney, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J. LEGAL 
PROFESSION 41, 46, 52 (2004) (noting that lawyers’ professional liability policies do not cover claims 
arising from dishonest, malicious, or fraudulent acts of an insured).  
139 See ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1989). In some cases, the lawyers may have also filed for bankruptcy. See, e.g., Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. 
v. Thorn, 783 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 2016). 
140 See Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
141 See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION r. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989) (“The 
purpose of the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection is to promote public confidence in the administration 
of justice and the integrity of the legal profession by reimbursing losses caused by the dishonest conduct 
of lawyers.”). See also Lawyers’ Fund, STATE BAR OF MONT., https://www.montanabar.org/page/LFCP; 
Client Protection Fund, STATE BAR OF N.D., https://www.sband.org/page/client_protect_claim (same). 
142 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION r. 1 cmt. 3, 2(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1989). 
143 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION r. 10(C). This includes “where the 
lawyer took money in the guise of a fee, a loan or an investment.” Rule 10 cmt. 3. 
144 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION Preamble. 
145 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION R. 3 (a). 
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among the drafters, however, the rules also recognize that the fund’s Board of Trustees may fix a 
maximum amount of reimbursement, even though “full reimbursement is the goal of a Fund.”146  
 Today, all U.S. jurisdictions have statewide client protection funds,147 but their 
“organization, funding, accessibility and responsiveness to client claims vary widely.”148 In 
many states, they are supervised by state bar organizations rather than the courts.149 More than 
thirty of the funds are financed by mandatory lawyer assessments, while the rest are funded by 
budget appropriations, voluntary lawyer contributions, or other means.150 The lawyer 
assessments range from $5 to $75 annually, except in Delaware, where the assessment is 
substantially higher.151  The funds are also empowered to seek restitution from the offending 
attorneys but those recoveries tend to be modest.152 Most of the jurisdictions have payment caps 
per claimant, with the average cap being $100,000.153 The majority also have a payment cap per 
lawyer, with the caps ranging from $20,000 to $1.5 million.154 In some years, the amounts 
available in some jurisdictions’ client protection funds exceed the legitimate claims.155  
 Client protection funds in the United States paid out about $35 million in 2019,156 
although clients’ actual monetary losses far exceeded that amount. This is mostly because the 
 
146 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION r. 14(1) & cmt. 
147 Directory of Lawyers Funds for Client Protection, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/cp_dir_fund.pdf
. 
148 A History of the Client Protection Rules, supra note 71. 
149 See, e.g., 2014-2016 Survey of Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection 3 (2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2014_16_surve
y_of_lawyers_funds_for_client_protection_final.pdf.  
150 Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 17-18 . 
151 Delaware lawyers in private practice who have been admitted more than ten years are required to pay 
$336. Id. at 19.  
152 See, e.g., 2019-2020 MISSOURI BAR ANNUAL REPORT 5, 
https://mobar.org/site/content/About/Annual_Report.aspx  (reporting less than $41,000 of restitution 
recovered in preceding year); STATE BAR OF NEVADA, CLIENTS’ SECURITY FUND ANNUAL REPORT 
2020, at 4, https://nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2020-Nevada-CSF-Annual-Report.pdf (reporting about 
$5000 of restitution recovered).  
153 This is based on the thirty-eight jurisdictions reporting to the ABA. See Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for 
Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 3. 
154 Id. at 25-26. 
155 Id. at 8 (“several funds” reported an inability to reimburse eligible claims due to payment limitations 
or lack of available funds.). 
156 The client protection funds that responded to the ABA’s most recent survey reported that they paid out 
approximately $32.3 million in 2019. See Survey of Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection 2017-2019, 
supra note 1, at 4 . Florida, Missouri, South Carolina, and the District of Columbia are among the 
jurisdictions that did not report to the ABA. Florida alone paid out at least $2 million. See Annual Reports 
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funds’ caps on recovery are grossly insufficient in some cases.157 For example, Nevada lawyer 
Robert Graham, whose probate and real estate practice “was a 20-year business failure” stole $17 
million from clients.158 Twenty-three of his clients filed claims with Nevada’s Client Security 
Fund in the “approved” amount of $7.85 million, but due to Nevada’s $50,000 per claimant cap, 
these clients recovered less than $1.1 million.159 Even with Pennsylvania’s $100,000 per victim 
cap, eleven clients’ losses exceeded that cap in 2019.160 A payment cap per lawyer can also leave 
clients grossly undercompensated. For example, one client only received $20,000—one-tenth of 
the money her Kentucky lawyer stole from her—because her lawyer had victimized many other 
clients and the Kentucky Bar Association capped per lawyer recovery at $150,000.161 Some 
jurisdictions place limits on the total amounts that the funds will pay out annually to all 
claimants.162 Florida only pays misappropriation claims on a pro rata basis at the end of the year 
 
of Committees of the Florida Bar, Clients’ Security Fund, FLA. B. J., May/June 2019, at 88, 99, 
https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/annual-reports-of-committees-of-the-florida-bar2018-
2019/#Clients_Security_Fund; Noreen Marcus, Florida Bar has money-back guarantee for clients of 
thieving lawyers, but collecting isn’t easy (May 9, 2018), FLORIDABULLDOG.ORG, 
https://www.floridabulldog.org/2018/05/florida-bar-has-money-back-guarantee-for-clients-of-thieving-
lawyers-but-collecting-isnt-easy/. Claims paid in South Carolina during the 2019-2020 year totaled 
$445,793. LAWYERS’ FUND FOR CLIENT PROTECTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANNUAL REPORT: JULY 1, 
2019-JUNE 30, 2020, at 2, https://www.scbar.org/media/filer_public/67/ac/67ace869-56d7-415f-b10a-
b36faadf2cc5/lfcp_ar.pdf. 
157 For instance, in Nevada, thirty-eight eligible clients had $2.5 million of approved losses in 2020 but 
only received $260,000—about one-tenth of that amount—from the client security fund. STATE BAR OF 
NEVADA, ANNUAL REPORT 2020, supra note 115, at 4. In Tennessee, the most common problem 
experienced by the client protection fund was “[l]arge claim losses exceeding Fund caps.” Survey of 
Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 12. See also Elizabeth Amon, An Empty 
Promise: How Client Protection Funds Around the Nation Betray Those they were Designed to Protect, 
N.J. L.J., Aug. 28, 2000, at 8. 
158 Jeff German, State Bar of Nevada want to disbar lawyer charged with stealing millions from clients, 
LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (March 10, 2017), https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/state-bar-of-
nevada-wants-to-disbar-lawyer-charged-with-stealing-millions-from-clients/. 
159 See STATE BAR OF NEVADA, CLIENTS’ SECURITY FUND ANNUAL REPORT 2019, at 6, 
https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019-Nevada-CSF-Annual-Report.pdf. Some of his other 
clients’ claims had not yet been resolved at the time of the report. 
160 PENNSYLVANIA LAWYERS FUND FOR CLIENT SECURITY, REPORT ON 2019-20 OPERATIONS 2, 
https://r91.5e5.myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/Annual-Report-2019-2020.pdf. According to the 
report, at the start of the 2019-20 fiscal year, the 159 pending claims carried an award potential of $2.97 
million after applying the $100,000 cap, but the actual claims exceeded $8.1 million. Id. 
161 See, e.g., Andrew Wolfson, Ripped off legal clients say a Kentucky fund that was supposed to 
reimburse them only gave them pennies on the dollar, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J. (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2019/02/25/kentucky-fund-ripped-off-legal-clients-
falls-far-short/2775939002/. 
162 For example, Oklahoma’s fund will only pay out a maximum of $175,000 annually for all claims. See 
Office of the General Counsel of the Oklahoma Bar Ass’n, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONAL 
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if there is not enough money to pay all approved losses.163 It will only refund unearned fees up to 
$5000.164  
 While the Model Rules for Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection contemplate that the 
goal of the funds is full reimbursement, in many jurisdictions, the states’ funds are described as a 
“public service” that carry no obligation to reimburse victims of lawyer defalcations.165 And 
indeed, many funds’ rules and practices reflect no commitment to full reimbursement of 
victims.166 Some of the funds operate with no court oversight and little transparency; at least ten 
jurisdictions do not publish any sort of annual report.167 Even some states that publish reports do 
not reveal the difference between the amounts victims actually lost and the amounts paid to them 
by the funds.168  
 Most fund claimants are clients whose lawyers retained unearned fees.169 The funds also 
pay out substantial dollar awards for thefts in personal injury, trust and estate, and real estate 
matters.170 These clients are sometimes unsophisticated consumers of legal services, yet many 
funds are not administered from a consumer-oriented perspective. In many jurisdictions, the 
 
RESPONSIBILITY COMMISSION, JAN. 1, 2020 – DEC. 31, 2020, at 18, https://www.okbar.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/2020-PRC-Annual-Report.pdf. 
163 Annual Reports of Committees of the Florida Bar, supra note 156, at 99; Marcus, supra note 156.  
164 See Clients’ Security Fund Frequently Asked Questions, FLA. BAR, 
https://www.floridabar.org/public/consumer/pamphlet007/#what-losses-are-covered. While advance fees 
paid by individual clients often fall within this range, they sometimes exceed that amount. See, e.g., In re 
Fleming, 970 So.2d 970 (La. 2017) (refusal to refund any of $25,000 fee); In re Hoffman, 834 N.W.2d 
636 (N.D. 2013) (refusal to refund any of $30,000 fee where reasonable fee was $4540). 
165 See, e.g., N.H. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 55(1); KAN. RULE RELATING TO LAWYERS’ FUND FOR 
CLIENT PROTECTION 241 (a)(3). 
166 See, e.g., MONT. LAWYERS’ FUND FOR CLIENT PROTECTION RULE 10 (stating that there is no legal 
right to reimbursement and that all payments “are a matter of grace”). In Missouri payments are limited to 
eighty percent of the amount of the loss greater than $5,000, with a maximum payment of $50,000. See 
2019-2020 MISSOURI. BAR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 152, at 5. 
167 Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 10. 
168 See, e.g., STATE BAR OF ARIZ., ANNUAL REPORT 2019, at 3, 
https://www.azbar.org/media/f0pk5mo5/2019-annual-report-final.pdf (revealing the amount paid out but 
not the amount actually lost by victims); Annual Reports of the Committees of the Florida Bar, supra note 
156; at 99 (same); STATE BAR OF TEX., COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE ANNUAL REPORT: JUNE 1, 
2019-MAY 31, 2020, at 11, 
https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&Con
tentID=41986 (same); WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, WASHINGTON DISCIPLINE SYSTEM 2019 ANNUAL 
REPORT 14, https://www.wsba.org/docs/default-source/licensing/discipline/2019-discipline-system-
annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn=d5100ef1_10 (same).  




availability of client protection funds is not publicized.171 In most jurisdictions, clients’ claims 
cannot be submitted electronically.172 Although the Model Rules for Lawyers’ Funds for Client 
Protection intend for the funds to provide “meaningful, prompt, and cost-free reimbursement to 
clients,”173 claimants typically must wait for reimbursement until a final disciplinary 
determination is made.174 This can take years during which some clients may be unable to hire 
another lawyer to represent them in an ongoing legal matter or obtain the medical and other care 
that they need. There is no question that whatever amount the client protection fund eventually 
pays victims is better than nothing. But in most jurisdictions, more could be done for these 
clients. 
 2. Insurance Payee Notification 
 One way in which individual clients could be better protected is by making it harder for 
lawyers to steal insurance settlement proceeds. Lawyers steal insurance proceeds in various ways 
including the unauthorized settlement of the client's claim with an insurer, forgery of the client’s 
signature on settlement documents and settlement checks, and misappropriation of the client’s 
share of the proceeds.175 In 2019, twenty-nine percent of the dollars paid by client protection 
 
171 See Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 10 (reporting that 
62% of reporting jurisdictions do not produce any public information or marketing material for their 
client protection funds). 
172 Id.  
173 See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1989). 
174 See, e.g., RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR 7-2.4; N.H. RULES OF SUPREME COURT 55(4); SUPREME 
COURT OF OHIO RULES FOR GOVERNMENT OF THE BAR VIII, § 7 (C)(3); The Client Security Fund of the 
State Bar of Texas, 
https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Free_Legal_Information2&Template=/CM/Conte
ntDisplay.cfm&ContentID=34079. In California, the average time to pay out for its client security fund is 
three years. See Letter from Leah T. Wilson, Executive Dir., State Bar of Cal., to Cal. Legislative Leaders 
(March 15, 2018), https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/2018ClientSecurityFundReport.pdf. In Wisconsin, 
some approved payments to claimants were deferred simply because the fund had insufficient money. See 
STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE WISCONSIN LAWYERS’ FUND FOR CLIENT 
PROTECTION, FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 2, 
https://www.wisbar.org/forPublic/IHaveaDisputeWithMyLawyer/Documents/FY%2018%20Annual%20
Report.pdf . 
175 MODEL RULE FOR PAYEE NOTIFICATION Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N 1991). 
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funds were due to lawyer theft of insurance settlement funds.176 These thefts can be substantial 
and often victimize seriously injured clients who require continuing medical care.177 
 In 1991, the ABA approved a Model Rule for Payee Notification that requires insurers to 
provide written notice to a claimant that they sent a payment to the claimant's lawyer in an effort 
to reduce the possibility that the lawyer can misappropriate the funds.178  Fred Miller, the former 
Executive Director of New York’s Client Protection Fund (the state that originated the insurance 
payee notification rule)179 noted that the rule “pretty well eliminated this type of claim in New 
York. But if it does occur, the rule also helps catch the defalcating lawyers.”180 Nevertheless, 
today only sixteen jurisdictions require insurance payee notification.181  
 Some state bar associations came to support a payee notification rule after becoming 
convinced that such a rule was needed to protect lawyers’ reputations or the solvency of client 
protection funds. For example, in 2007, Virginia trial lawyers initially opposed efforts to require 
insurance payee notification.182 A few months later, after lawyer Steven Conrad was arrested and 
charged with settling hundreds of cases without clients’ approval and signing their names to 
settlement checks, the Virginia State Bar approved a payee notification rule.183 In Louisiana, the 
State Bar supported payee notification legislation in 2011 after it saw the impact of claims due to 
thefts of insurance settlement funds on Louisiana’s Client Assistance Fund.184 But the insurance 
industry opposed it on the grounds it was burdensome and the bill did not progress to a vote in 
 
176 Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 8. 
177 See, e.g., Letter from Douglas J. Stamm, former Chair, Or. Client Security Fund to Or. State Bar Board 
of Governors (Nov. 14, 2019) (describing several claims involving losses far exceeding the $50,000 cap 
in which “claimants suffered from permanent disabilities such as paralysis”). 
178 See A History of the Client Protection Rules, supra note 71.  
179 The Model Rule for Payee Notification was based on a New York rule that required insurers to notify 
the payee in insurance settlements when it sent out checks to the claimant’s attorney in excess of $5,000. 
Id.; 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 216.9(a) (1988). 
180 Lynda C. Shely, The ABA Model Rules for Trust Account Notification and Model Rule for Payee 
Notification: Client Protection for the Millennium, PROF’L LAW., Spring 2000, at 23. 
181 These jurisdictions are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia. See Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for 
Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 44; Oregon State Bar, Meeting of the Board of Governors 
Minutes 172-175 (Feb. 12, 2021); 2021 Or. Laws Ch. 140 (S.B. 180). The Texas Insurance Commission 
encourages insurers to notify clients when they send out settlement checks, but does not require it. See 
infra note 231 and accompanying text.  
182 See Marc Davis, A lawyer’s misdeeds spur state bar to revisit proposal, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (March 16, 
2008), https://www.pilotonline.com/news/article_9396105f-71b9-5d12-b838-e1c90e95cdfa.html. 
183 Id. 
184 Leefe, supra note 131, at 34. 
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the legislature.185 In 2021, Oregon became the most recent state to adopt such a requirement, 
which the Oregon State Bar actively supported after it learned of substantial insurance settlement 
defalcations by a single lawyer that resulted in numerous claims against its client security 
fund.186 
 Other jurisdictions have declined to adopt payee notification, sometimes due to the bar’s 
indifference or resistance. For example, the Florida Bar’s Client Security Fund Committee 
recommended to the Board of Governors in 1996 that it adopt payee notification, but the 
Committee was unable to generate Bar support for the proposal.187 Since then, lawyer 
misconduct involving insurance settlement checks has repeatedly occurred.188 The State Bar of 
Arizona’s Board of Trustees also rejected such a rule.189 Several jurisdictions report that they 
have never even considered the ABA’s recommendation on payee notification.190 Admittedly, 
the failure to adopt payee notification in some jurisdictions is also be due to anticipated or actual 
insurance industry opposition.191 The net effect, however, is that individual clients are more 
vulnerable to lawyer theft in states that do not require payee notification.  
 
185 Id. 
186 See Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Ballot Measure 110 Implementation in 
Support of Senate Bill 180 with the 2 amendments on Behalf of the Oregon State Bar (March 8, 2021), 
https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2021R1/Downloads/PublicTestimonyDocument/12231; Nigel 
Jaquiss, Lawmakers and Oregon State Bar Weigh Protections for Victims of Dishonest Lawyers, 
WILLAMETTE WEEK, https://www.wweek.com/news/courts/2021/02/15/lawmakers-and-oregon-state-bar-
weigh-protections-for-victims-of-dishonest-lawyers/ (describing Bar’s response to thefts by lawyer Lori 
Deveney, who “allegedly stole millions of dollars by cashing their settlement checks from insurers”); 
Letter from Douglas J. Stamm, supra note 177. 
187 See Annual Report: Committees of the Florida Bar, FLA. B.J., June 1996, at 52, 73. 
188 See, e.g., In re Gray, 145 So.3d 825 (Fla. 2014); Fla. Bar v. Brownstein, 953 So.2d 502, 508 (Fla. 
2007); Fla. Bar v. Catalano, 685 So.2d 1299, 1300-01 (Fla. 1997); Florida Bar v. Sweeney, 730 So.2d 
1269, 1270 (Fla. 1998); Christy Turner, St. Johns County Lawyer Sentenced for Stealing Insurance Claim 
Settlements, CBS47 (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.actionnewsjax.com/news/local/st-johns-county-lawyer-
sentenced-for-stealing-insurance-claim-settlements/902467067/; Disbarred lawyer arrested for 
defrauding clients out of $700K, FDLE says, 10TAMPA BAY (Dec. 11, 2020), 
https://www.wtsp.com/article/news/crime/former-clearwater-lawyer-fraud-arrest/67-ecec86e0-1373-
4b05-a8f4-fdc5e00f10ad; An Orlando lawyer stole $111,000 from clients, Bar says, got suspended and 
ignored it, MIAMI HERALD (May 16, 2021), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article251453043.html. 
189 See Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 44; Telephone 
Interview by Adam Mackie, Reference Librarian, University of Conn. Law Library of Karen Weigand 
Oschmann, Client Protection Fund Admin., State Bar of Ariz. (May 6, 2020). 
190 Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 44-45.  
191 In one jurisdiction the voluntary state bar never formally took a position after informal conversations 
revealed that because the legislature included many insurance agents, such legislation was unlikely to 
pass. See E-mail from Adam Mackie, Reference Librarian, University of Conn. Law Library, to author 
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 3. Random Audits of Trust Accounts 
 Some lawyers steal from clients by helping themselves to funds they are holding in client 
trust accounts. In an effort to reduce these thefts, the ABA’s McKay Commission recommended 
in 1992 that courts adopt a rule providing for random audits of client trust accounts.192 At that 
time, eight jurisdictions already used random audits and the McKay Commission noted that they 
had “proven effective to deter and detect the theft of funds even before clients file 
complaints.”193 In 1993, the ABA adopted the Model Rule for Random Audit of Trust 
Accounts.194 A few additional jurisdictions subsequently adopted random audit procedures.195 
Today, however, there are only nine states with operational random audit programs.196 
One of those states is Connecticut, which first considered random audits in the late 1980s 
after a prominent Danbury lawyer stole more $2 million from his client trust account.197 In 1990, 
the Connecticut Bar Association’s (CBA) Task Force on the Commission of Legal Ethics 
recommended a host of measures to improve lawyer regulation, including random audits of trust 
accounts.198 The CBA’s Board of Governors endorsed the proposal, but the CBA’s House of 
Delegates narrowly rejected it.199 The following year, Connecticut’s Judicial Council on Legal 
Ethics also recommended random audits, contending it was an essential part of the package of 
 
(June 2, 2021, 10:49 EDT). In Michigan, the State Bar supported a payee notification rule, but it did not 
progress in the legislature. See Proposed Payee Notification Legislation – State Bar of Michigan (Apr. 21, 
2018), https://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/pdfs/4-21-18payee_notification.pdf; 2017/2018 At the 
Capitol, MICH. B. J. 83 (May 2018), 
http://www.michbar.org/file/barjournal/article/documents/pdf4article3394.pdf; see also supra note 185 
and accompanying text..  
192 LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 70, at 75. It explained that the usual 
requirement imposed on disciplinary counsel to show cause to believe misconduct occurred before 
permitting an audit made it difficult to detect thefts that were ongoing. Id. at 76. 
193 Id. at 76. The jurisdictions were Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York (First and Second 
Departments), North Carolina, Vermont, and Washington. Id.   
194 A History of The Client Protection Rules, supra note 71. 
195 The jurisdictions are Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, and Maine. See Survey of 
Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 42; HAW. RULES GOVERNING TRUST 
ACCOUNTING R. 7 (2014). 
196 Those jurisdictions are Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Vermont, and Washington. See OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF N.J., 
supra note 67, at 49. 
197 See Andrew Houlding, Price of Propriety: $300 Per Lawyer, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1991, at 32; 
Talks Urged in Suits Against Judge’s Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1988, at 48. The lawyer was also 
working as a probate judge, but the defalcations were due to theft of money connected to real estate 
transactions. 




recommended reforms.200 The Connecticut Supreme Court, which was then dealing with its own 
budget problems was reportedly “reluctant to take on a fight to squeeze more money out of legal 
practitioners” to finance regulatory reforms and wanted the CBA’s Task Force Chair to take the 
lead on getting the CBA to accept the reforms.201 The Task Force chair was apparently unable to 
garner CBA support. It was not until 2006, the year after Connecticut lawyers misappropriated 
more than $12.5 million during a three-month period, that a CBA Task Force again 
recommended random audits.202 The thefts had attracted significant attention in the popular 
press.203 It was only then—and without input from the CBA House of Delegates—that the 
Connecticut Supreme Court adopted a rule enabling random trust account audits.204 
 New Jersey has been a national leader in the use of random audits.205 Its Office of 
Attorney Ethics acknowledges that the deterrent effect is “not quantifiable” but maintains that 
“[j]ust knowing there is an active audit program is an incentive not only to keep accurate records, 
but also to avoid temptations to misuse trust funds.”206 In 2019, New Jersey’s Random Audit 
Compliance Program conducted 556 audits. Fourteen lawyers were disciplined—including four 
disbarments—through the program’s detection efforts.207 Over the program’s thirty-nine year 
existence, 234 attorneys, “detected solely by this program, have been disciplined for serious 
ethical violations.”208   
 Jurisdictions offer a variety of reasons when they decline to adopt random audit 
programs. Some conclude that the cost of a random audit program would be too great to justify 
 
200 Why Lawyers Must Pay for Reform, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1991, at 32. 
201 Houlding, supra note 197. 
202 See Douglas Malan, Practice Book Rules Bare Teeth, CONN. L. TRIB. (May 22, 2006).  
203 See, e.g., Hilda Munoz, Suspended Lawyer is Arraigned; Elizabeth Zemko Accused of Stealing from 
Clients’ Bank Accounts, Estates, HARTFORD COURANT, May 6, 2005, at B2; Fran Silverman, Cracking 
Down on Unethical Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at 3; Daniel Tepper, Claims coming fast for 
victims of lawyers, CONN. POST (Sept. 1, 2005); Father, son accused of stealing clients’ money, AP, Jan. 
21, 2005. 
204 See Douglas Malan, Judges Embrace Lawyer-Theft Crackdown; Increased Policing of Attorney 
Advertising Also Wins Final Approval, CONN. L. TRIB. (July 3, 2006). 
205 OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF N.J., supra note 67, at 49. 
206 Id.  
207 Letter from Charles Centinaro, Dir., N.J. Office of Attorney Ethics, to Chief Justice Stuart Rabner and 
Associate Justices of the N.J. Supreme Court (May 11, 2020), 
https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/oae/2019oaeannualrpt.pdf. 
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imposing the expense on lawyers.209 As the Florida State Bar’s president explained after the idea 
was considered and rejected there, “First of all, who’s going to pay for it?” He continued, “The 
bar can’t afford to hire an auditing firm to go around the state and audit lawyers’ trust 
accounts.”210 Others note that these audits mostly pick up low-level, unintentional errors.211 
Some contend that random audits do not pick up all defalcations because lawyer theft does not 
necessarily involve trust account violations.212 In addition, opponents argue, general audit 
practice is to reconcile trust account balances, and such auditing may be insufficient to detect 
defalcations.213  
 Yet New Jersey’s experience demonstrates that the audits can be performed by auditors 
in ways that detect lawyer theft.214 While the cost of random audits cannot be ignored, the 
number of audits need not necessarily be substantial to have some deterrent effect. Meanwhile, 
lawyer theft from client trust accounts remains a serious problem. Lawyers who steal from these 
accounts sometimes take large sums of money.215 These thefts can continue for months or even 
 
209 See In re Promulgation of Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court for Registration of 
Attorneys, Report of the Client Security Board, C9-81-1206, at A-19 – A20 (July 1998), 
https://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/AdministrativeFileArchive/Client%20Security%20Board
%20ADM10-8026%20(formerly%20C0-85-2205)/1998-07-28-Client-Security-Bd-Annual-Rpt.pdf. 
210 Celia Ampel, Sticky Fingers: Attorney Thefts from Clients Spiked in Great Recession, FLA. BUS. REV. 
(March 9, 2018), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2018/03/09/sticky-fingers-attorney-thefts-
from-clients-spiked-in-great-
recession/#:~:text=Florida%20saw%20an%20uptick%20in,to%20keep%20their%20practices%20afloat. 
211 See, e.g., Gary Blankenship, Trust Accounting Pilot Program May be Ready for Board Action in 
March, FLA. B. NEWS (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/trust-accounting-
pilot-program-may-be-ready-for-board-action-in-march/.  
212 In re Promulgation of Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court for Registration of Attorneys, 
supra note 209, at 20. 
213 Id. 
214 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
215 See, e.g., Kelsey Gibbs, Fallen Trooper’s Daughter Speaks Out on Attorney Going to Prison for 
Stealing from Clients, NEWSCHANNEL5 NASHVILLE (Apr. 22, 2019), 
https://www.newschannel5.com/news/attorney-sentenced-for-stealing-more-than-1m-from-clients-trust-
funds (discussing Tennessee attorney who stole over $1.35 million from clients’ accounts); R. Robin 
McDonald, Disbarred Lawyer Sentenced to Federal Prison for Stealing Escrowed Funds, DAILY REPORT 
(July 21, 2020) (discussing Georgia lawyer who stole more than $335,000 from escrow account); Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Millions missing from lawyer’s trust account, bar alleges after he abruptly closes law 
firm, ABA J. (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer_transferred_home_to_his_wife_after_abruptly_closing_
law_firm_bar_all; U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts, Former Real Estate Attorney 
Sentenced to 66 Months in Jail for Defrauding Clients and Lenders (Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-real-estate-attorney-sentenced-66-months-prison-defrauding-
clients-and-lenders (describing Massachusetts lawyer who stole over $450,000 from client trust account); 
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years before they are detected.216 Some of these losses might have been deterred or averted if the 
jurisdictions had adopted rules enabling regulators to randomly audit client trust accounts. 
IV. WHAT HAPPENED TO  CLIENT PROTECTION? 
 What explains the failure by many jurisdictions to adopt adequate client protection 
measures? To answer this question, it is necessary to start with the state supreme courts, which in 
most jurisdictions are ultimately responsible for adopting the rules governing lawyers. As 
previously noted, these courts also have a number of other important responsibilities, some of 
which may present more obvious, pressing or pervasive challenges. Given the demands of other 
court business, state supreme courts may not have the time or inclination to examine the 
adequacy of their states’ client protection measures unless the bar or state regulators bring a 
problem to their attention. Moreover, supreme court justices do not see many fee disputes 
between lawyers and individual clients; those clients can rarely afford to litigate those issue to 
the state’s highest court. Courts may not focus on the operation of fee arbitration programs as 
they are typically bar-run activities. Likewise, courts may be unaware of the inadequacy of the 
payments to some victims of dishonest lawyers when they do not oversee their states’ client 
protection funds.217   
 And what about the state legislatures? Legislatures tend to give the courts a wide berth on 
issues pertaining to lawyer regulation.218 This is because state courts claim the inherent or 
constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law,219 and a few claim the exclusive right to 
 
Office of District Attorney, Harris County Texas, Disbarred Houston Lawyer Steals More than $500,000 
from Client (Oct. 2, 2020), https://app.dao.hctx.net/disbarred-houston-lawyer-steals-more-500000-client 
(describing misappropriation from client trust account). 
216 See, e.g., Disbarred Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Stealing from Clients’ Escrow Accounts, DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY KINGS COUNTY (June 4, 2015), http://www.brooklynda.org/2015/09/10/disbarred-lawyer-
pleads-guilty-to-stealing-client-escrow-funds/ (describing lawyer who stole hundreds of thousands of 
dollars from more than twenty-five clients over more than four-year period); Zak Fallia, Disbarred 
Attorney Charged with Stealing from Escrow Fund Accounts in Westchester, ARMONK DAILY VOICE 
(Sept. 7, 2019), https://dailyvoice.com/new-york/armonk/news/disbarred-attorney-charged-with-stealing-
from-escrow-funds-accounts-in-westchester/775163/ (describing lawyer who stole from escrow accounts 
over four-year period). 
217 Even if supreme courts review client protection funds’ reports, those reports often do not reveal the 
differences between what the funds paid out and the amounts actually lost by claimants. See supra note 
168 and accompanying text. 
218 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 19, at 1007. The exception is California, which takes a more active role in 
lawyer regulation than other jurisdictions. See id. at 978, 1002-1003. 
219 Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977, 980 (Mo. 1937) (noting that the Court “has the inherent power to 
define and regulate the practice of law”); Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 
261 S.W.3d 24, 34 (Tex. 2008) (stating that the Court’s inherent power to regulate the practice of law 
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do so.220 Legislators may harbor concerns that any law they pass regulating the legal profession 
could be struck down on separation of powers grounds.221 Moreover, there is rarely anyone 
lobbying for legislative involvement to protect the public’s interests. Economic theory helps 
explain the public’s absence from the debates. Producers of goods and services (in this case, 
lawyers) are more likely to invest in political action than are consumers due to producers’ narrow 
focus on their own products or income, in contrast to consumers’ more varied areas of 
concern.222   
 The most motivated actor when it comes to lawyer regulation is the legal profession 
itself, and it can play an outsized role in lawyer regulation. After the ABA promulgates model 
rules, state bars usually weigh in on whether those rules should be adopted in their jurisdictions, 
either on their own initiative or at the state supreme court’s request.223 Both mandatory and 
voluntary state bars engage in these activities. In some jurisdictions, mandatory bars can be 
especially influential in this process.  
 The mandatory (or “unified”) bars began to appear in the 1920s because some lawyers 
believed that a compulsory statewide association, well-financed from dues and possessing the 
power to discipline members, could influence state legislatures far better than a voluntary, 
financially weak bar organization.224 Proponents thought that these bars would be beneficial for 
lawyers’ economic interests,225 and that mandatory bars could also benefit the public, because 
they provided a means of gaining greater resources to raise the quality of the profession and fill a 
 
derives from the state constitution); see also Laura Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against “Legal 
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N.W.2d 251, 256 (Neb. 2006); In re Splane, 16 A. 481, 483 (Pa. 1889); Rigertas, supra note 219, at 69; 
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12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 1, 6-7 (1989).  
221 See Leslie C. Levin, The Politics of Bar Admission: Lessons from the Pandemic, HOFSTRA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021). 
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GROUPS 10-36 (1965). 
223 See, e.g., supra note 46.  
224 See DAYTON D. MCKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 36, 39-40, 43-44, 48 (1963). 
225 Id. at 34, 36. Proponents believed that mandatory bars could both restrict the number of lawyers and 
set minimum fee schedules. See Bradley A. Smith, The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the 
Unified Bar Harms the Legal Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 38 (1994). 
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regulatory vacuum.226 Today, statutes or court rules in some states provide for participation by 
mandatory state bar organizations in changes to the rules governing lawyers.227 Rule proposals 
from a few mandatory state bars require votes by rank-and-file members.228 In other 
jurisdictions, the courts routinely solicit the mandatory bar’s views or wait for the state bar to 
make proposals.229 Not surprisingly, lawyers are often reluctant to endorse regulation that 
imposes additional obligations or subject themselves to greater scrutiny.  
 Texas’s approach to client protection illustrates some of this dynamic. Texas does not 
require lawyers to provide written fee agreements in most matters or submit to mandatory fee 
arbitration.230 It is one of only three states that does not require trust account overdraft 
notification and has not adopted an insurance payee notification requirement or random audits.231 
 
226 See Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from the 
Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 17–18. 
227 See e.g., OR. REV. STAT § 9.490(1) (2020). The mandatory North Carolina State Bar has statutory 
power to adopt rules and regulations for the Bar, which shall be certified to the Supreme Court, and the 
Court may only decline to have them entered if the Chief Justice concludes they are inconsistent with the 
statute governing the State Bar. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-21 (2020). 
228 See, e.g., IDAHO BAR COMM’N RULES r. 906(a); infra note 235 and accompanying text. 
229 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 19, at 1028. 
230 TEXAS R. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE r. 1.04(c); Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-
2019, supra note 1, at 44. Texas is also one of only two states where disciplinary counsel must show that 
a lawyer’s fee is “unconscionable” rather than simply “excessive” in order to impose discipline. See 
SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS 16 (2017), 
https://www.sunset.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/reports/State%20Bar%20of%20Texas%20and%20Boar
d%20of%20Law%20Examiners%20Staff%20Report%20with%20Final%20Results_6-21-17_0.pdf. 
231 See Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 42, 44. In 2010, the 
State Bar did, however, ask the Texas Insurance Commissioner to assist with efforts to prevent lawyer 
thefts and in turn, the Commission “strongly encouraged” insurers to voluntarily notify claimants that the 
settlement checks were sent to their lawyers. See Commissioner’s Bulletin B-0035-10, TEX. DEPT. OF 
INSURANCE (Aug. 10, 2010), https://www.tdi.texas.gov/bulletins/2010/cc34.html. Nevertheless, lawyer 
theft of settlement checks continues to occur in Texas, suggesting that not all insurers are complying with 
the request. See, e.g., Andrew Moore,“There was always an excuse”: Killeen ex-attorney costs clients 
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44e1bc09bebc (describing lawyer who settled case and took insurance money without client’s 
knowledge); Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Ex-Client Sues Onetime Lawyer Over Settlement, TEX. LAW., May 
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proceeds for almost two years); John Rupolo, Former Abilene Attorney Burt Burnett Pleads Guilty to Not 
Paying Clients Settlement Money, KTXS12 (Oct 29, 2019), https://ktxs.com/news/crime-watch/former-
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insurance settlement money from clients, KTXS12 (Aug. 3, 2018), https://ktxs.com/news/abilene/abilene-
attorney-accused-of-pocketing-settlement-money; Disciplinary Actions, TEX. B.J., June 2020, at 412-13. 
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Texas lawyers have stolen millions of dollars from clients,232 yet Texas caps payments from its 
Client Security Fund at $40,000 per claimant.233 So what is going on in Texas? In Texas, the 
Supreme Court regularly seeks the State Bar’s views on issues pertaining to lawyer regulation 
and the Bar often responds in ways that reflect its members’ interests.234 Although the Supreme 
Court has the inherent authority to adopt rules governing Texas lawyers, the Texas State Bar Act 
provides for a State Bar referendum on rule proposals before the Supreme Court adopts rules 
governing the conduct of State Bar members.235 The Court “has historically chosen to defer to a 
vote of State Bar members before making significant changes” to its Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct.236 So, after a torturous eight-year process to amend the Texas rules to 
bring them more in line with the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct—which involved 
several public hearings and reconciling draft amendments submitted by a Supreme Court Task 
Force, the State Bar, and the Texas Supreme Court237—a 2011 State Bar referendum to amend 
the Texas rules failed in all respects.238 This occurred even though the final draft submitted to 
 
232 See, e.g., Office of District Attorney, supra note 215 (describing Houston lawyer who misappropriated 
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234 For example, when the Texas Supreme Court considered whether to adopt a rule requiring uninsured 
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insurance disclosure rule. Id. at 1024. 
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https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1374851/How-Court-Rules-Are-Made.pdf. From 1987-2021, there were 
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Misc. Dkt. No. 09-9175 (Tex. Sup. Ct. Oct. 20, 2009); Timeline of Development of Proposed Rules (on 
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State Bar members was one that had been approved by the State Bar leadership.239 The Supreme 
Court adopted no rule changes at that time. 
 Although the State Bar of Texas is also subject to sunset reviews by the Texas legislature 
every twelve years,240 that process has only led to modest improvements in client protection. In 
1990, the Sunset Commission staff recommended that Texas’s Client Security Fund—which had 
been established in 1975 by the State Bar— should be statutorily placed under the oversight of 
the Supreme Court, that the caps on payments to victims should be raised, and that the fund 
should be required to maintain a minimum balance..241 In response, the State Bar increased its 
Funds’ claims cap from $20,000 to $30,000 and required a minimum fund balance of $1.25 
million.242 Once the State Bar did this, the Texas legislature did not provide for Supreme Court 
oversight of the bar-run Client Security Fund, as the Sunset Commission recommended.243 In the 
most recent sunset review cycle (2016-2017), the State Bar’s Chief Disciplinary Counsel and the 
Sunset Commission staff recommended trust account overdraft notification but the Sunset 
Commission, which is composed of twelve Texas legislators, did not adopt the 
recommendation.244 The reason was apparently due, in part, to legislators’ concerns about 
burdening the banks.245 The Commission staff also recommended that the legislature repeal 
requirements for a State Bar referendum to approve disciplinary rule changes because the State 
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244 SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS, supra note 230, at A-8, 26-27. 
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during the last Sunset review. See State Bar of Texas, Self-Assessment Report to the Sunset Advisory 
Commission 93, 278-79 (Sept. 1, 2015), 
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Bar rulemaking process “obstructs changes needed to effectively regulate lawyers.”246 
Nevertheless, on the motion of Sunset Commission member Senator Kirk Watson, a former 
member of the Texas State Bar’s Executive Committee,247 the Sunset Commission “modified” 
the Sunset staff’s recommendation and decided to retain the referendum process but streamline 
the Bar’s rulemaking process.248 The legislature, in turn, established a new State Bar committee 
to improve the State Bar’s rulemaking process, which included an opportunity for the public to 
provide input.249 It retained the State Bar referendum process for proposed disciplinary rule 
changes that originate with the State Bar.250 
 As the Texas example suggests, mandatory bars include many constituents and there may 
be instances where there are disagreements among bar leadership, bar regulators working within 
the organization, state bar committees, and bar members when it comes to lawyer regulation. 
Depending upon the attitudes of bar leadership and the processes for gaining bar approval of 
certain measures, there may be times when a mandatory bar expresses support for consumer 
protection measures even though rank-and-file members disagree.251 Obviously, when lawyer 
regulation is subject to bar members’ approval, it can be more difficult to implement regulation 
that places additional obligations on lawyers. 
 In fact, even though mandatory bars claim that public protection is part of their mission, 
several jurisdictions with mandatory bars have adopted substantially fewer “client protection” 
measures than jurisdictions with voluntary state bars. This may occur due to the influence of 
mandatory bars on judicial decisionmaking or because of the state’s process for rule adoption. 
One rough indicator that states with mandatory bars, on the whole, may provide fewer of the 
client protection measures discussed in this article can be seen in the tables below, which show 
the jurisdictions with the most and fewest client protection measures.  
 
246 SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS, supra note 230, at 3. 
247 See Meet Kirk, KIRK WATSON TEXAS SENATOR, http://www.kirkwatson.com/meet-kirk/. 
248 SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS, supra note 230, at A7. 
249 See TEX. STATE BAR ACT §§ 81.0876-81.0879 (2017); SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF 
REPORT WITH FINAL RESULTS, supra note 230, at A1.  
250 TEX. STATE BAR ACT §§ 81.0877-81.0878 (2017). After the new State Bar committee was constituted 
in 2017, it vetted eight proposals that were approved by Texas State Bar members in a 2021 referendum. 
None concerned protection of client money. See Texas Lawyers Approve Rule Amendments in 2021 Rules 
Vote, supra note 235; COMMITTEE ON DISCIPLINARY RULES AND REFERENDA, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 8-
13, 
https://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu/CDRR/Annual_Reports1/2020AnnualReport.pdf. 
251 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 19, at 1013-14. 
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Alaska* x x x   $50,000 
Arizona* x  x  x $100,000 
California* x x x x  $100,000 
Connecticut x  x x x No cap 
Delaware   x x x No cap 
D.C.* x x x   $100,000 
Hawaii* x  x x x $100,000 
Maine  x x  x $50,000 
Montana* x x x   No cap 
Nebraska   x x x No cap 
New Jersey x x x x x $400,000 
New York  x x x x x254 $400,000 
Pennsylvania x  x x  $100,000 
 
 Jurisdictions with at least three of the five client protection measures previously 
discussed are included in Table I, which shows the jurisdictions with the most client protection 
measures. The jurisdictions’ per claimant caps on client protection fund awards are also 
displayed but were not weighted when calculating which jurisdictions were seemingly the most 
and least protective of clients. While the caps on claimants’ client protection fund recoveries are  
indicative of a jurisdiction’s commitment to client protection, the caps may also vary due to 
 
252 For support for the data in Table I, see supra notes 44, 82, 181, 196, and accompanying text; Survey of 
Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 25; Clients’ Security Fund, D.C. BAR, 
https://www.dcbar.org/for-the-public/resolve-attorney-problems/clients%E2%80%99-security-fund; E-
mail from Mike Larson, Coordinator, Lawyer Assistance Program, State Bar of Mont., to author (July 14, 
2021, 10:18 EDT) (stating there is no claim cap on the amount clients can recover, but recovery is limited 
to the amount available in the fund).   
253 The jurisdictions listed in this column have rules providing for random audits but it is not clear that 
they all continue to perform them. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. Simply having these rules 
on the books, however, may have some deterrent effect. 
254 Only New York’s First and Second Departments provide for random audits. See N.Y. APP. DIV. FIRST 
DEPT. RULES § 603.27; N.Y. APP. DIV. SECOND DEPT. RULES § 691.12(a). 
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differences in the claims experience in the jurisdictions. Thus, Alaska and Maine are included in 
the table with the most client protection measures even though they cap victims’ client protection 
fund recoveries at the relatively low amount of $50,000.255 It seems noteworthy that the majority 
of states with the most client protection measures are jurisdictions with voluntary state bars, even 
though thirty-two of the fifty-one jurisdictions in the United States have mandatory state bars. 
Stated differently, almost 37% of the jurisdictions with voluntary state bars appear in Table I 
while only 18.75% of the jurisdictions with mandatory bars appear there.256  
 There are, however, some alternate explanations for this pattern. It is conceivable that the 
six northeastern states with voluntary state bars that appear in Table I have more client protection 
measures because lawyers steal larger amounts of client money in those states. Some support for 
this explanation can be found in the fact that from 2017-2019, fifty-eight percent of the money 
paid by client protection funds came from thirteen jurisdictions in the Northeast and middle 
Atlantic states.257 But this fact could, alternatively, be due to the fact that that these jurisdictions 
have client protection funds with higher claims caps.258 The explanation might also be due to 
diffusion of client protection rules to neighboring jurisdictions. States have long emulated other 
states’ policies through a process known as policy diffusion.259 Policy diffusion is often seen in 
 
255 The Alaska State Bar’s most recent annual report indicates that its Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection 
considered no claims in 2018. See ALASKA BAR ASSOCIATION 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, at 
4. The preceding year, it considered one claim, for which it paid $2500. See ALASKA BAR ASSOCIATION 
2017 ANNUAL REPORT 4, https://alaskabar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017-annualreport.pdf. Since Maine’s 
Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection was established in 1997, it has approved claims of $816,567, but it 
does not report the actual amount of the claims. See Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection 2019 Annual 
Report 3, https://mebaroverseers.org/complaint/Annual_Reports/2019%20Annual%20Report.pdf. In 
2019, it only received one claim, which was in the amount of $2500. Id. 
256 One additional state with a mandatory bar that almost made it into Table I was Georgia, which has 
trust account notification and payee notification. See Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 
2017-2019, supra note 1, at 42, 44. Georgia does not have mandatory arbitration, but it places some 
pressure on lawyers to participate in fee arbitration due to the presumption concerning the fairness of the 
award in enforcement proceedings if the client prevails in arbitration and the lawyer did not participate. 
See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, Georgia does not make arbitration mandatory 
and has an extremely low cap on its client protection fund ($25,000), which seemingly makes it 
inappropriate to classify it as a one of the most protective jurisdictions. If it had been included in Table I, 
however, the percentage of all mandatory bars that appear in that table would increase to 21.875%. 
257 See Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
258 In fact, the client protection funds in Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire place no per claimant cap on recoveries. See id. at 25-26. 
259 See Lawrence J. Grossback et al., Ideology and Learning in Policy Diffusion, 32 AM. POL. RES. 521, 
521 (2004). This process is affected by many variables and can occur through mechanisms including 
imitation and learning. See Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 849, 841 (2010); see also Tiffany Bergin, How and Why Do Criminal Justice Public Policies 
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geographically proximate states,260 which may help explain why some of the Northeastern states 
take similar approaches to client protection. It is also conceivable that the northeastern states and 
California are politically more “consumer-oriented” than other parts of the country. The National 
Consumer Law Center’s evaluation of the states with the “best” and worst” consumer protection 
laws suggests that a state’s consumer protection orientation may help to explain why a few of the 
jurisdictions appear in either table.261 Regression analyses would be needed to more reliably test 
the impact of this factor. 
 Perhaps more telling is Table II, showing the jurisdictions on the other end of the 
spectrum. All but one of the jurisdictions with the fewest client protection measures have 
mandatory state bars. Three of the jurisdictions with the fewest client protection measures 
(Mississippi, South Dakota, and Texas) have instituted none of the measures discussed in this 
article. It should be noted, however, that two of those three (Mississippi and South Dakota) have 
among the weakest consumer protection laws in the country.262 Michigan and Minnesota are 
outliers in Table II because their client protection funds have relatively generous per claimant 
caps. While it is conceivable that some of the other jurisdictions in Table II see relatively low-
level lawyer defalcations, this cannot be said of other jurisdictions like Indiana, Louisiana, and 
Texas.263  
 
Spread Throughout the U.S. States? A Critical Review of the Diffusion Literature, 22 CRIM. JUST. POLICY 
REV. 403, 416 (2011). 
260 See Bergin, supra note 259, at 405. 
261 There does not appear to be a state-by-state ranking of states’ consumer protection orientations. The 
National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) has analyzed states’ consumer protection laws on a variety of 
measures, but it only identifies a few of the “best” and “worst” jurisdictions. See, e.g., Consumer 
Protection in the States: A 50-State Evaluation of Unfair and Deceptive Practices (2018), NCLC, 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf. According to the NCLC, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, and Vermont have the most protective laws. Id. at 2-3. Only one of those 
Northeastern states (Connecticut) appears in Table I, as does Hawaii. Colorado, Oregon and South Dakota 
have the weakest substantive consumer protection statutes in the country. Id. at 13. Iowa and Mississippi 
provide the weakest remedies for consumers. Id. at 44. Two of those five jurisdictions appear in Table II, 
which shows the jurisdictions with the fewest client protection measures. 
262 See supra note 261. Mississippi and South Dakota do require lawyer certification of compliance with 
recordkeeping rules. This is not an ABA-recommended client protection measure, but it is tracked by the 
ABA. See Survey of Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 42.  
263 For some Texas cases see supra note 232. For some of the defalcation cases in Louisiana and Indiana, 
see Karen Kidd, Hammond attorney suspended indefinitely after conviction for stealing at least $186,000 
from client, LA. REC. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://louisianarecord.com/stories/523756156-hammond-attorney-
suspended-indefinitely-after-conviction-for-stealing-at-least-186-000-from-client; Zach Parker, Facing $2 




























Alabama*   x   $75,000 
Indiana*    x   $15,000 
Louisiana*   x   $25,000 
Michigan*   x   $150,000 
Minnesota   x   $150,000 
Mississippi*      $10,000 
North 
Dakota* 
  x   $25,000 
South 
Dakota* 
     $10,000 
Texas*      $40,000 
Utah*   x   $20,000 
 It must be noted, however, that if one other ABA-recommended “client protection” 
measure were considered—rules regarding disclosure of whether a lawyer carries malpractice 
insurance—the jurisdictions with mandatory bars would look somewhat more protective of 
 
judgment-for-defrauding-blind-client-monroe-attorney-seeks-new-trial/article_b66d6c54-7135-11eb-
b764-db7fe7f81c6f.html (describing Louisiana lawyer who admitted stealing more than $1.8 million from 
client); Martha Neil, Ex-Lawyer Accused of Stealing $4.5M from Clients is Now Represented by Public 
Defender, ABA J. (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ex-lawyer (describing 
Indiana personal injury lawyer); Teresa Auch Schultz, Valparaiso Attorney to Plead Guilty in Client Theft 
Case, CHICAGO TRIB. (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/ct-ptb-
valparaiso-attorney-to-plead-guilty-st-0425-20150424-story.html (reporting on Indiana lawyer who stole 
more than $ 2 million); Robert Stafford, Suspended Lawyer Accused of Thefts from Disabled Clients 
Jailed on Warrant (July 21, 2020), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/suspended-lawyer-
accused-of-thefts-from-disabled-clients-jailed-on-warrant (describing Indiana lawyer who stole more than 
$250,000 from clients); David Stafford, Justices in Tug-of-War Over Judge in Suit Accusing Ex-Lawyer 
of Estate Theft, INDIANA LAW. (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/justices-in-tug-
of-war-over-judge-in-suit-accusing-ex-lawyer-of-estate-theft (describing Indiana lawyer who allegedly 
stole more than $775,000 from a widow client’s estate). 
264 For support for the data in Table II, see supra notes 44, 82, 181, 196 and accompanying text; Survey of 
Lawyers’ Funds for Client Protection 2017-2019, supra note 1, at 25-26; Client Security Fund, STATE 
BAR OF S. D., https://www.statebarofsouthdakota.com/p/cm/ld/fid=28. 
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clients than they do in the tables provided here.265 In fact, insurance disclosure rules—as 
compared to the requirement that lawyers maintain malpractice insurance— provide relatively 
weak client protection because clients often do not see the disclosures or understand their 
implications.266 The only jurisdictions that go further than the ABA’s disclosure 
recommendation—and require lawyers to maintain lawyer professional liability insurance 
(Oregon and Idaho)—have mandatory state bars.267 In Oregon, the bar proposed mandatory 
insurance largely because they believed that a state professional liability fund would result in 
lower insurance rates for lawyers.268 In Idaho, however, bar members (narrowly) approved the 
change on public protection grounds.269 The mandatory State Bar of South Dakota proposed that 
state’s insurance disclosure rule, which arguably imposes more demanding direct disclosure 
requirements on uninsured lawyers than anywhere else in the country.270 Thus, there are times 
when mandatory state bar members will support client protection measures.271 There are also 
jurisdictions where mandatory state bars have less influence on the rulemaking process than in 
 
265 See Compendium of Client Protection Rules, ABA, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/client_protection/contents/; 
ABA MODEL RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004). Minnesota and South Dakota 
are the only jurisdictions in Table II that require that insurance information be disclosed on an official 
website (Minnesota) or directly in writing to clients (South Dakota). See Leslie C. Levin, Lawyers Going 
Bare and Clients Going Blind. 68 FLA. L. REV. 1281, 1299-1301 (2016). 
266 See Levin, supra note 265, at 1325-27. 
267 See About the PLF, OSB PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY FUND, https://www.osbplf.org/about-
plf/overview.html; 2018 Malpractice Coverage Requirement-General Information, IDAHO STATE BAR 
(2019), https://isb.idaho.gov/blog/2018-malpractice-coverage-requirement/.  
268 See Daniel O’Leary, The Professional Liability Fund: Milestone, OR. ST. B. BULL., June 1978, at 9 
(describing an Oregon State Bar Board of Governors statement about the benefits to lawyers of the 
professional liability fund). 
269 See Diane K. Minnich, 2016 Resolution Process – The Results, THE ADVOCATE, Jan. 2017, at 22. 
270 Uninsured lawyers in South Dakota are required to disclose directly to clients, on firm letterhead, and 
in any advertising that they do not carry professional liability insurance. See S.D. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.4 (c) (2020). The State Bar’s Professional Liability Insurance Committee “felt that we 
owed it to clients in South Dakota to inform them if the attorneys had malpractice insurance or not.” E-
mail from Jeffrey T. Sveen, former President, S.D. Bar, to Leslie C. Levin (April 29, 2015, 17:52 EDT). 
The Committee’s recommendation was approved by State Bar members at its Annual Meeting. See 
Committee Reports of the State Bar of South Dakota 55-56 (1999) (on file with author).  
271 This could also be seen with respect to some of the client protection measures described in this article. 
For instance, the California State Bar supported legislation that would require written fee agreements 
where the fee was expected to exceed $1000. See Business Associations and Professions, 18 PAC. L.J. 
467, 473-74 (1987) . It is worth noting, however, that this occurred during a period, when the State Bar 
was under intense scrutiny by the state legislature. See RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL: 
UNDERSTANDING ETHICAL MISCONDUCT 22-43 (2011). 
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some other states.272 Closer study is needed to determine whether, on balance, jurisdictions with 
mandatory state bars tend to produce regulation that is less protective of the public, and whether 
this occurs because of the activities of the state bars. If this is the case, it is not necessarily 
because voluntary state bars are more concerned with client protection. Rather, voluntary state 
bars may simply have less direct influence in the rulemaking process.  
CONCLUSION 
 It is important to reiterate that state bar associations are just part of this story. There are 
several other factors that contribute to the extent to which client protection measures are 
implemented in any jurisdiction. These include, inter alia, the state supreme court’s view of its 
role in lawyer regulation, the jurisdiction’s rulemaking process, the incidence of lawyer 
overreaching in a state, and the money available for regulatory responses. Case studies and more 
fine-grained, systematic comparisons of the political and economic conditions in various 
jurisdictions would be needed to better identify why the regulatory differences occur.273 
 What is evident, however, is that in some jurisdictions individual clients are not 
adequately protected, and that the courts share responsibility for this state of affairs. Courts need 
to be more engaged when considering client protection measures. They should not over-rely on 
state bars—which are inherently self-interested organizations—to determine how to regulate 
lawyers. Courts should create their own task forces to consider possible changes in lawyer 
regulation. These task forces should include non-lawyer consumer advocates (and not just 
“friends of lawyers”) who will speak out to protect clients’ interests. Where the courts maintain 
responsibility for certain client protection measures—such as fee arbitration and client protection 
funds—they should insist on receiving reports that meaningfully advise them of how well these 
programs are operating. Where these programs are not under court supervision, the courts should 
investigate whether they should assume an oversight role—as the ABA recommended—to 
ensure that the programs are operating in a manner that adequately protects the public.  
 
272 In Hawaii, the Supreme Court appoints an independent task force and then invites comment on the 
proposed rules. See, e.g., James A. Kawachika, The New Hawa’i Rules of Professional Conduct: What 
you Absolutely Need to Know and Why—Part I, HAW. B. J., Mar. 2014, at 4; Court Briefs, HAW. B.J., 
Feb. 2011, at 22; see also HSBA Happenings, HAW. B.J., Mar. 2019, at 15 (describing the mandatory 
Hawaii State Bar Association’s decision not to comment on Supreme Court’s proposed rule change). 
273 See generally Virginia Gray, The Socioeconomic and Political Context of States in POLITICS IN THE 
AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 3-23 (Virginia Gray et al., eds., 11th ed. 2018) 
(describing the many reasons why states make different policy choices). 
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 If courts are not willing to do this work, then they should allow the state legislatures to 
step in to protect the public. Admittedly, this is unlikely in jurisdictions where state courts 
maintain that they have the exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law and that “any 
encroachment” by the legislature is unacceptable.274 Other courts, however, have been more 
flexible, indicating a willingness to uphold legislative regulation of the legal profession “in aid of 
the court’s judicial functions,”275 as a matter of comity,276 or on other grounds.277 A few have 
gone further, recognizing that the legislature has its own role to play in regulating the legal 
profession.278  
 There are seemingly openings in some states for the legislatures to do more to protect 
vulnerable clients. Some courts have concluded that consumer protection laws of generally 
applicability can be applied to lawyers.279 As one court noted, “entrepreneurial aspects of legal 
 
274 See Beyers v. Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082, 1090-92 (Pa. 2007); see also In re Infotechnology, 582 A.2d 
215, 218 (Del. 1990) (referring to the court’s “sole and exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting 
governance of the Bar”); Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah v. Utah, 374 P.3d 14, 20 (Utah 2016) (noting 
court’s authority is both exclusive and “extensive”); In re Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 454 N.W.2d 770, 
773 (Wis. 1990) (referring to “the exclusive authority of the judicial branch to define and regulate the 
activities” of lawyers). 
275 See In re Kaufman, 206 P.2d 528, 539 (Idaho 1949); see also Hays v. Ruther, 313 P.3d 782, 409-10 
(Kan. 2013); Attorney General of Maryland v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929, 937 (Md. 1981); Shenendoah 
Sales & Serv. v. Assessor of Jefferson County, 724 S.E.2d 733, 741 (W. Va. 2012); Walter W. Steele, Jr., 
Cleaning Up the Legal Profession: The Power to Discipline—The Judiciary and the Legislature, 20 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 413, 418 (1978).  
276 See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 180 N.E.725, 727 (Mass. 1932); Wolfram, supra note 220, at 
16.  
277  See, e.g., Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218, 1222–23 (Or. 1976) (recognizing the 
legislature’s police power to protect the public); Bester v. Louisiana Supreme Court Comm. on Bar 
Admission, 779 So. 2d 715, 718 (La. 2001) (indicating that the legislature may pass laws regulating the 
practice of law that do not “destroy, frustrate, or impede the court’s inherent constitutional authority”). 
278 See In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d 49 (Cal. 1998) (noting that court has respected the 
legislature’s exercise of a reasonable degree of regulation of the legal profession); Bergman v. District of 
Columbia, 986 A.2d 1208, 1225 (D.C. App. Ct. 2010) (stating that the court’s “primary power” to 
discipline lawyers does not mean that the legislature is “precluded from playing any role in the regulation 
of attorneys and the practice of law”); Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 548 (Fla. 2014) (noting that the 
legislature “also possesses the inherent authority to regulate some aspects of legal regulation”); Newton v. 
Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105, 111 (Tenn. 1994) (observing “that areas exists in which both the legislative and 
judicial branch have interests, and that in such areas, both may exercise appropriate authority”). 
279 See Pepper v. Routh Crabtree, APC, 219 P.3d 1017, 1024 (Alaska 2009); Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 
209 (Colo. 2006); Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 461 A.2d 938, 944-45 
(Conn. 1983); Andrews & Lawrence Prof’l Services, LLC, v. Mills, 223 A.3d 947, 962-66 (Md. 2020); 
Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 170 (Wash. 1984). But see Cripe v. Leiter, 703 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ill. 
1998); Beyers v. Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082, 1089-92 (Pa. 2007) (refusing to apply consumer protection 
statutes to lawyers). 
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practice—how the price of legal services is determined, billed, and collected…are business 
aspects of the legal profession” and therefore properly subject to the state’s consumer protection 
act.280 Another observed when upholding the application of the state’s consumer protection 
statute to lawyers, “[w]e should not permit the special relationship of attorneys to the judiciary to 
blind us to the fundamental importance of the relationship of attorneys to their clients.”281 Some 
courts have also upheld statutes specifically aimed at protecting lawyers’ clients, such as laws 
limiting lawyers’ recoveries in contingent fee cases282 and setting attorneys’ fee formulas in 
workers compensation matters.283  
Legislatures may be able to do even more to protect vulnerable clients. For example, they 
may be able to require that fee arrangements must be in writing in order for lawyers to bring suit 
to recover their fees (other than on a quantum meruit basis).284 Such a law would not interfere 
with the courts’ authority over lawyers in the discipline process and would be likely to 
incentivize more lawyers to put their fee agreements in writing. Legislatures should be able to 
require insurance companies to provide payee notification—and are even better positioned than 
courts to do so—without causing courts concern that their authority is being usurped. Likewise, 
because of state legislatures’ role in funding the state courts, they could provide funding for 
random audits and more money for client protection funds. (Although the likelihood they would 
do so seems low given other legislative priorities.) 
 The point here is not that it would be preferable for state legislatures—rather than the 
courts—to assume responsibility for adopting additional client protection measures. The courts 
have more expertise with respect to these issues285 and more reasons to be concerned about 
lawyers’ conduct. Moreover, Texas’s experience with its Sunset Commission suggests that some 
 
280 Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d at 168. 
281 Heslin, 461 A.2d at 946. 
282 See, e.g., Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 695 P.2d 164, 168-69 (Cal. 1985) (upholding statute 
limiting contingent fee recovery to 25%); Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1994) (upholding 
statute limiting contingent fee recovery by lawyers to 33% in medical malpractice cases). 
283 See, e.g., David v. Bartel Enterprises, 856 N.W.2d 271, 274-75 (Minn. 2014); see also Multiple Injury 
Trust Fund v. Coburn, 386 P.3d 628, 636-39 (Okla. 2016). 
284 It seems less likely that courts would uphold statutory requirements that lawyers submit to fee 
arbitration. But see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6200(c) (2021) (making arbitration mandatory for lawyers 
in fee disputes). In California, however, the Supreme Court already accedes to significant legislative 
involvement in lawyer regulation. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
285 See Benjamin Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer 
Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1240 (2003). 
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legislators may be more concerned about protecting corporate interests than they are about public 
protection. Rather, the point is that legislatures should be able to act to better protect the public if 
the courts lack the time, attention or political will to do so. Of course, before any legislature is 
likely to act, there would need to be advocates for client protection measures. Success in the 
legislature would also be difficult because state bars already bankroll lobbyists who advocate for 
lawyers’ interests. Yet the mere possibility that the state legislature will act to further protect 
clients may induce state supreme courts and state bars to give client protection issues more 
serious attention. Regardless of whether it is the courts or the state legislatures that are ultimately 
moved to act, ordinary clients need and deserve more protection than they are currently 
receiving. 
  
